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Abstract 
 
 
Ordinarily, philosophers arguing for the possibility of time travel restrict 
themselves to defending time travel against allegations of inconsistency and contradiction. 
These objections are usually based on particular theories about time and causality. I 
believe, however, that this way of arguing can be turned on its head. By using the 
conceivability thesis – that is, the thesis that if something is conceivable, then it is also 
possible – we can put forward a positive argument for the possibility of time travel, and 
then consider how this should inform our metaphysical views. 
 
I do this by assuming the truth of the conceivability thesis and then presenting a 
simple piece of time travel fiction. I argue for the conceivability of this story and, in doing 
so, attempt to show that the time travel journey it describes is logically possible. I then 
develop this argument by considering other more controversial cases of time travel. I make 
minor alterations to the original time travel story in order to show that there are a number 
of different kinds of time travel journeys (including cases of both forwards and backwards 
time travel) which are conceivable and, therefore, logically possible. 
 
Finally, I ask how the conceivability of different types of time travel should affect 
the metaphysical views we choose to adopt. I argue that since the conceivability of time 
travel entails the logical possibility of journeys to other times, any plausible theory of time 
must be able to accommodate such journeys. I also explain how the conceivability of time 
travel entails the logical possibility of two particularly unusual cases of causation. I argue 
that the conceivability of instantaneous time travel entails the logical possibility of 
causation at a distance, and that the conceivability of backwards time travel entails the 
logical possibility of backwards causation. Any plausible theory of causation must 
therefore be able to account for the possibility of these two types of causation. I consider 
one particular theory of causation which does not (namely, that put forward by D.H. 
Mellor), and then attempt to establish where it goes wrong. 
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Chapter 1: Conceiving of a Time Travel Journey 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Time travel is possible. While some time travel stories may be incoherent, this only 
demonstrates the impossibility of certain cases of time travel. In this thesis I will argue that 
there is nothing essentially inconsistent about time travel journeys. 
 
Ordinarily, philosophers arguing against the logical possibility of time travel do so 
by making specific allegations of contradictions.  These arguments tend to follow a very 
similar structure. Firstly, they outline something that time travel supposedly allows us to 
do. Secondly, they describe how this particular thing is logically impossible. The Time 
Discrepancy Objection, for example, states that time travel allows for time discrepancies to 
occur, but that such discrepancies are logically impossible. Suppose that thirty-year-old 
Vincent travels ten years into the past. If this is possible, then it would be possible for 
Vincent to be thirty years old only twenty years after the date of his birth. This, however, 
seems contradictory. The Two-Places-at-Once Objection, on the other hand, states that 
time travel is impossible because it allows someone to be in two places at once (say, by 
allowing thirty-year-old Vincent to go and shake hands with his twenty-year-old self), but 
that this state of affairs is also contradictory. 
 
These kinds of arguments are easily refuted, and Ken Perszyk and Nicholas J.J. 
Smith have already provided an excellent summary of how we might go about doing this.
1
 
Further, in ‘The Paradoxes of Time Travel’2 David Lewis provides a defense against one 
of the strongest arguments against the possibility of time travel – the infamous Grandfather 
Paradox.
3
 
                                                 
1
 Ken Perszyk and Nicholas J.J. Smith, The Paradoxes of Time Travel, presented at Te Papa (National 
Museum of New Zealand) on 23 August 2001. 
2
 David Lewis, ‘The Paradoxes of Time Travel’, Philosophical Papers Volume II (Oxford University Press, 
1987), pp. 67-80. 
3
 This is the paradox which arises from a story in which a time traveller goes to the past and attempts to kill 
his or her own grandfather. A minor variation on this is the Auto-Infanticide Paradox, where the time 
traveller attempts to kill his or her younger self. 
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A much stronger argument against the possibility of time travel is that it is 
essentially inconsistent. An argument of this kind is usually based upon the claim that all 
time travel stories necessarily contain a contradiction. John Bigelow raises this objection in 
‘Time Travel Fiction’.4 He argues that time travel stories require a “deep spatialization of 
time”,5 but that such a view of time is incoherent. In this thesis I will attempt to refute the 
claim that time travel is essentially inconsistent. I will not attempt to reply to Bigelow’s 
specific argument, but will instead put forward my own positive argument for the logical 
possibility of some cases of time travel. If successful, this argument will preclude any 
potential claim that time travel is essentially inconsistent, regardless of how that objection 
is made. 
 
In The Conscious Mind
6
 David Chalmers argues for the possibility of psychological 
zombies by using the conceivability thesis. This is the thesis that if something is 
conceivable, then that thing must also be logically possible. I believe a similar argument 
can be made for the possibility of time travel. In order to do this, I will analyse the 
conceivability of time travel by looking at fictional stories. I will argue that some time 
travel stories are conceivable, and that the conceivability of these stories provides good 
evidence for the logical possibility of the time travel journeys they describe. 
 
In Chapter 1 of this thesis I will argue for the conceivability of one particular case 
of time travel – namely, an instance of instantaneous forwards time travel. In Chapters 2 
and 3 I will expand this argument by demonstrating the conceivability of several other 
cases of time travel. In doing so, I will show that there are many time travel journeys 
(including cases of both forwards and backwards time travel) that are perfectly conceivable 
and, therefore, logically possible. 
 
In Chapter 4 I will discuss what implications the conceivability of time travel has 
for our view of time. In ‘No Time Travel for Presentists’,7 Steven D. Hales puts forward 
                                                 
4
 John Bigelow, ‘Time Travel Fiction’ in Gerhard Preyer & Frank Siebelt (eds.), Reality and Humean 
Supervenience: Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001), pp. 57-
91. 
5
 Ibid., p. 57. 
6
 David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1996), pp. 93-99. 
7
 Steven D. Hales, ‘No Time Travel for Presentists’, Logos & Episteme I, 2 (2010), pp. 353-360. 
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the familiar argument that presentism is incompatible with time travel. If this is correct, 
then presentists must hold that there is no possible world in which time travel occurs. If my 
argument is successful however, it will show that there is time travel in some possible 
world irrespective of what any contrary metaphysical theory might say. I will argue that 
presentism must either be made to accommodate the logical possibility of time travel 
(something which Simon Keller and Michael Nelson have already attempted to do)
8
 or 
abandoned altogether. 
 
Finally, in Chapter 5 I will discuss what implications the conceivability of time 
travel has for our view of causality. In Real Time II,
9
 D. H. Mellor outlines a theory of 
causation which holds causation at a distance and backwards causation to be logical 
impossibilities. The conceivability of certain cases of time travel, however, allows us to 
conceive of these very types of causation. I will consider what this means for Mellor’s 
view of causation. 
 
I will conclude that many cases of time travel are conceivable, and therefore 
logically possible. This possibility precludes any argument that time travel is essentially 
inconsistent. Not only this, but it also has serious ramifications for any metaphysical theory 
which holds time travel as a logical impossibility. 
 
 
2. Vincent’s Story 
 
Consider the following story:  
 
Vincent has built a time machine. Vincent steps into the machine at 12.00pm on 
Wednesday 1
st
 January 2020. He sets the destination time on the machine’s control panel to 
“6.00pm Wednesday 1st January 2020” and presses the ‘On’ button. The machine 
disappears. At 6.00pm that same day the machine reappears. The physical processes going 
on within Vincent and the time machine are now exactly as they would have been 
immediately after Vincent pressed the ‘On’ button at 12.00pm if he had not in fact pressed 
the button. Vincent exits the time machine (conveniently located in his garage) and goes 
                                                 
8
 Simon Keller and Michael Nelson, ‘Presentists Should Believe in Time Travel’, Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy, Vol. 79, No. 3 (September 2001), pp. 333-345. 
9
 D.H. Mellor, Real Time II (London: Routledge, 1988). 
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into his living room. Once there, he makes a cup of tea and turns on the television to watch 
the six o’clock news. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
I believe that this story is conceivable, and that its conceivability provides good 
evidence for the logical possibility of the time travel journey it describes. In order to make 
this argument we must show that (1) Vincent’s story is a time travel story, (2) Vincent’s 
story is a conceivable time travel story, and (3) the conceivability of Vincent’s story 
implies its logical possibility. 
 
For the purposes of this paper I will assume that (3) is true. In ‘Does Conceivability 
Entail Possibility?’ David Chalmers puts forward a persuasive argument for the connection 
between conceivability and logical possibility.
10
 It is clear that we cannot properly 
conceive of something which is logically impossible
11
 – we cannot, for example, conceive 
of a married bachelor or a three-sided square. The conceivability thesis builds upon this 
observation, stating that if we can properly conceive of something then that thing must be 
logically possible. As Paul Tidman notes, the significance of the conceivability thesis is 
that “if true, it promises to provide an independent epistemological means by which we can 
determine what is possible.”12 
 
If the conceivability thesis is true, then the way in which we can clearly imagine, 
explain, and reason about some time travel stories provides us with good evidence for the 
logical possibility of the time travel journeys they describe. Thus, if Vincent’s particular 
story is conceivable, then Vincent’s story will also be possible. 
 
I will now consider (1) and (2) in turn. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10
 David Chalmers, ‘Does Conceivability Entail Possibility’ in T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (eds), 
Conceivability and Possibility (Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 145-200. 
11
 Exactly what it means to ‘properly’ conceive of something is a topic I will soon turn to. 
12
 Paul Tidman, ‘Conceivability as a Test for Possibility’, American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 4 
(October 1994), p. 298. 
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3.  Is Vincent’s Story a Time Travel Story? 
  
 Is Vincent’s story a time travel story? It certainly resembles many of those stories 
that we call ‘time travel stories’, but mere resemblance is not enough. Some stories 
describe series of events which seem to be time travel but which, on closer inspection, turn 
out to be something else entirely. Certain facts must be present in Vincent’s story in order 
for it to contain a genuine case of time travel. 
 
Firstly, a genuine time travel journey must involve travel to the actual past or future 
– not some replica of it.13 Visiting the set of a period film or going to a medieval fair does 
not count as time travel, nor does travelling to an alternate universe which merely looks 
like the past or future of our own universe. Vincent’s journey satisfies this requirement. He 
has not arrived in some futuristic facade replete with actors and clocks secretly running 6 
hours fast, nor has he travelled to the future of some other universe. When Vincent steps 
out of his time machine he finds himself at the ‘real’ 6.00pm on Wednesday 1st January 
2020. 
 
Secondly, a genuine time traveller must be able to physically interact with the time 
to which he travels.
14
 Merely having visions of the past or future (as does A Christmas 
Carol’s Ebenezer Scrooge) is not sufficient. Vincent’s journey satisfies this requirement 
too, as evidenced by his ability to exit his machine and interact with his surroundings. 
 
 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a genuine time travel journey requires a 
discrepancy between the period of time travelled and the duration of the journey.
15
 The 
period of time travelled (hereafter referred to as p) is the difference in time between the 
time traveller’s point of departure and his destination. If Vincent time travels from 
12.00pm to 6.00pm, then p will be 6 hours. The duration of the journey (hereafter referred 
to as d) is the period of time the time traveller experiences while travelling from his point 
of departure to his destination. If Vincent experiences the journey as being instantaneous, 
then d will be 0. In order for a time travel journey to be genuine, p cannot equal d. 
Vincent’s journey meets this requirement as p is 6 hours while d is 0. 
                                                 
13
 Perszyk and Smith, op. cit., p. 1. 
14
 Ibid., p. 2. 
15
 Ibid.. See also Lewis (1987), op. cit., p. 67. 
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 Vincent’s story therefore contains the necessary requirements for a genuine case of 
time travel.  
 
 
4. Is Vincent’s Story a Conceivable Time Travel Story? 
 
Is Vincent’s story conceivable? It certainly seems to be, at least on some intuitive 
notion of conceivability. We understand the facts of the story, and understanding these 
facts does not require us to deal with any obvious contradictions. We understand the idea 
of a man whose name is Vincent. We understand disappearances, reappearances and the 
passage of time in the ordinary way. We can even understand the idea of a time machine 
and what it is meant to be capable of doing (even if we do not understand precisely how it 
does it). 
 
But understanding these particular facts is not the same as conceiving of the story 
which contains them. If our test for conceivability were only this rigorous, then we would 
find that many time travel stories are ‘conceivable’ – including some stories which turn out 
to be logically impossible. Consider Marty McFly’s journey in Back to the Future.16 Marty 
travels from 1985 to 1955 and jeopardises his own conception by inadvertently preventing 
his parents from meeting for the first time. The facts of this story may be understandable, 
but the time travel journey it describes is contradictory. Marty’s experience is a classic 
case of the second-time-around fallacy: that is, the mistaken idea that something can both 
happen and not happen at the very same time. Marty’s parents either meet in 1955, or they 
do not. It cannot be the case that both of these scenarios occur. Despite this, the time travel 
story presented in Back to the Future seems to suggest that they do. 
 
 The second-time-around fallacy is often avoided by assuming that the time 
traveller does something other than travelling to the actual past. Perhaps Marty does travel 
back in time, but also skips to a parallel timeline in which his meddling in the past can be 
accommodated without contradiction. Thus Marty does not travel to 1955, but rather 
1955*; an alternate 1955 where he is free to interfere with his parents’ meeting. When 
                                                 
16
 Back to the Future, Dir. Robert Zemeckis, Universal Pictures, 1985. 
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Marty travels back to 1985 he is in fact returning to 1985*, the future of 1955*.
 
On this 
interpretation Marty’s journey would appear as follows: 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
There are two problems with this interpretation. Firstly, if Marty skips timelines, 
then interfering with the meeting of his parents in 1955* could in no way affect the 
meeting of his parents in the timeline from which he originates. Despite this, Marty’s slow 
fading from existence in the final act of the film seems to show that Marty has clearly 
affected the history of his own timeline.
17
 Secondly, if Marty had skipped timelines, then 
his journey would fail to meet the first requirement of a genuine time travel journey: that 
is, that the time traveller travels to the actual past or future. Marty’s story would be 
logically possible, but would no longer be a time travel story. 
 
Back to the Future is a logically impossible time travel story. If we maintain the 
facts required to ensure Marty’s journey is a genuine time travel journey, then we are faced 
with an unavoidable contradiction. Since we cannot conceive of a contradiction, it must be 
the case that our initial conception of Back to the Future was flawed. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17
 There are other problems with the parallel-timeline interpretation of Marty’s journey. Upon ‘returning’ to 
1985* Marty is reunited with his family and girlfriend. But these are not the same loved ones he left behind 
in 1985. They are completely different people with different histories and personalities; people with whom 
Marty shares no common memories. What’s more, 1985* was already inhabited by a Marty (let’s call him 
Marty*). Marty arrives in 1985* just in time to see Marty* travel back in time. What is to become of that 
individual? Does Marty* also travel back to 1955*, or has he too skipped timelines and travelled to an 
entirely new 1955**? And what of Marty’s family in 1985? For them Marty has simply vanished, never to 
return again. 
1985 1955 
1985* 1955* 
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4.1 Prima Facie versus Ideal Conceivability 
 
David Chalmers highlights this problem by drawing a distinction between ‘prima 
facie’ and ‘ideal’ conceivability.18 This distinction describes the rigour with which we 
must analyse the conceivability of a story. According to Chalmers, something will be 
prima facie conceivable when that thing “is conceivable... on first appearances”. 19 
Vincent’s story meets this requirement, but then so does Back to the Future.20 The problem 
with prima facie conceivability is that it is an imperfect guide to possibility.
21
 Some stories 
(such as that in Back to the Future) are conceivable on first appearances, but do not remain 
conceivable on further analysis. As Chalmers notes:
22
 
 
It sometimes happens that [something] is prima facie conceivable... but that this prima 
facie conceivability is undermined by further reflection showing that the tests that are 
criteria for conceivability are not in fact passed. In this case, [that thing] is not ideally 
conceivable. 
 
In this way, something which is prima facie conceivable can be shown to be 
inconceivable on further reflection. This will usually be done by “isolating a contradiction 
or a misdescription in an apparently conceivable state of affairs”.23 When a prima facie 
conceivability judgement is undermined, so too are any grounds that the conceivability 
judgement provides for a claim of possibility.
24
 For this reason, Vincent’s story needs to be 
ideally conceivable. Something will be ideally conceivable where it “is conceivable... on 
ideal rational reflection”.25  
 
What is meant by ‘ideal rational reflection’? According to Chalmers, “one could try 
to define ideal conceivability in terms of the capacities of the ideal reasoner – a reasoner 
free from all contingent cognitive limitations”.26 The only difficulty with this approach is 
that it is possible that for every ideal reasoner, there is a more sophisticated ideal 
                                                 
18
 Chalmers (2002), op. cit., p. 147. 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 A story which leads to an unavoidable contradiction (assuming we wish to keep those facts which make it 
a time travel story in the first place). 
21
 Chalmers (2002), op. cit., p. 159. 
22
 Ibid., p. 147. 
23
 Ibid. 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 Ibid (emphasis added). 
26
 Ibid., p. 148 (emphasis added). 
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reasoner.
27
 Alternatively, one might adopt a notion of indefeasibility. That is, in order for 
something to be ideally conceivable, there must be justification for the conceivability “that 
cannot be rationally defeated”. 28  While this approach would provide us with an 
exceptionally reliable test for conceivability, it runs into great difficulties in its application. 
How are we to know whether or not our justifications are indefeasible? Some things might 
seem indefeasibly conceivable, despite there being some possible (though as yet 
undiscovered) defeasor in existence. 
 
It is true that we can never know for certain whether or not we are ‘ideally’ 
conceiving of some situation, however Chalmers does not think that proof of the 
indefeasibility of each case of ideal conceivability is required. Instead, he argues that by 
using the term ‘indefeasible’ he is “simply appealing to our intuitive grasp of notions of 
reasoning and of when one reasoning process defeats another”.29 He notes that the concept 
of indefeasibility is often employed in epistemological statements and that for this reason 
claims of conceivability are no worse-off than claims of knowledge. 
 
The sceptic, however, will still believe that our inability to have any certainty 
regarding ideal conceivability should lead us to be sceptical about the possibility of time 
travel. I disagree. We have not set out to provide irrefutable proof of the ideal 
conceivability of some time travel stories. Instead, it should be sufficient to give very good 
reasons for believing that these stories are conceivable (and therefore possible). While we 
may not have certainty regarding our ability to conceive ideally of time travel fictions, the 
fact that we seem so sure of it provides good evidence for their possibility. 
 
 
4.2 Positive versus Negative Conceivability 
 
In order to conceive ideally of Vincent’s story, we must do more than just 
understand the facts that are described to us. We must be able to reflect rationally on those 
facts and their relationship with one another. According to Chalmers, we can conceive of 
something in either of two ways: negatively, or positively. Something will be negatively 
                                                 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Ibid. 
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conceivable when that thing “is not ruled out a priori”30 and positively conceivable when 
“one can form some sort of positive conception of a situation in which [that thing] is the 
case.
 31
 Put simply, to say that something is negatively conceivable is to say that “as far as 
we know, X is conceivable”. To say that something is positively conceivable is to say that 
“X is conceivable”. 
 
In this way, something may be negatively conceivable even where some (as yet 
undiscovered) contradiction exists. Positive conceivability, on the other hand, ensures that 
no contradiction exists by forcing us to imagine those facts which would allow that thing to 
be the case.
32
 For this reason, the positive conceivability of Vincent’s story would provide 
us with a much stronger argument for the logical possibility of time travel than would its 
negative conceivability. This follows Chalmer’s view that both “ideal positive 
conceivability and ideal negative conceivability are promising as guides to possibility”,33 
but that “due to its added strength, the former is in a slightly better position to be a perfect 
guide than the latter”.34 
 
What will count as a positive conception of Vincent’s story? According to 
Chalmers, imagination is the key:
35
 
 
It is common to imagine situations in considerable detail, and this imagination is often 
accompanied by interpretation and reasoning. When one imagines a situation and reasons 
about it, the object of one’s imagination is often revealed as a situation in which [that thing] 
is the case. 
 
 There are, however, two different ways in which we might imagine the time travel 
journey described in Vincent’s story. 
 
 
                                                 
30
 Ibid, p. 149. 
31
 Ibid, p. 150 
32
 This distinction should sound familiar. Negatively conceiving of some state of affairs is analogous to the 
way in which we argue for the possibility of travel by refuting allegations of inconsistency. In both cases we 
attempt to show that something is not ruled out. In neither case, however, do we prove that it could not be 
ruled out. 
33
 Ibid. p. 161. 
34
 Ibid. 
35
 Ibid, p. 150. 
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4.3 Perceptual Imagination 
 
The most common way to imagine something is to conjure up a mental image of 
that thing. This is what Chalmers refers to as ‘perceptual imagination’.36  Perceptually 
imagining something is different from merely ‘supposing’ or ‘entertaining’ that that same 
thing is the case.
37
 When we suppose or entertain a particular proposition P, we adopt a 
certain attitude towards that proposition. Usually this just requires us to stipulate that P is 
true. Perceptual imagination, on the other hand, “involves an attitude not just toward P, but 
toward some specific situation that stands in a certain relationship to P”38 – that is, a 
situation that makes P true. This ‘situation’ is the mental image which contains the thing 
we are attempting to conceive of. The process of perceptual imagination is described well 
by Paul Tidman, who states that:
 39
 
 
In order to tell whether a state of affairs is possible... we should... attempt to form a mental 
image of the state of affairs. If we succeed in doing so, that suffices to show that the state 
of affairs is possible. 
 
Consider an example. If we were asked to suppose or entertain the proposition that 
“there is a working perpetual motion machine” we would merely need to stipulate this as 
true. If we were instead asked to imagine perceptually that “there is a working perpetual 
motion machine” we would be required to adopt an attitude regarding some situation 
which, if real, would make that statement true. Perhaps we would imagine switching on 
such a machine, watching it run, and watching it continue to run indefinitely with no new 
power input whatsoever.  
 
Vincent’s story describes a situation that, if real, would make time travel possible. 
We can perceptually imagine Vincent’s garage and the events that occur within on that 
fateful Wednesday afternoon. We can picture Vincent stepping into the machine, setting 
his destination, and pressing the ‘On’ button. We can picture the machine disappearing and 
then reappearing six hours later. We can even picture Vincent emerging from the machine 
                                                 
36
 Ibid. 
37
 Ibid. 
38
 Ibid. 
39
 Tidman, op. cit., p. 298. 
18 
 
having experienced nothing of the previous six hours. If perceptual imagination is what we 
mean by conceivability, then we are quite capable of conceiving of Vincent’s story. 
 
 Is perceptual imagination the right test for conceivability however? It is clear that 
perceptual imagination is not necessary for possibility, as there are many possible things 
that we cannot perceptually imagine.
40
 This is not fatal to the argument above however. All 
that is required is that perceptual imagination is sufficient for possibility. But is this the 
case? It appears not. Evidence for this can be found in the fact that we seem to be quite 
capable of forming mental images of states of affairs which involve contradictions. 
Consider the works of M. C. Escher, many of which contain visual representations of 
impossible situations (see specifically Ascending and Descending, Belvedere, and 
Waterfall).
41
 Likewise, we can form a mental image of the story presented to us in Back to 
the Future, despite the fact that this story is impossible. As Tidman notes, it seems that we 
can form a mental image of almost any state of affairs whatsoever,
42
 and that this should 
“preclude drawing any conclusions concerning the possibility of the state of affairs from 
the mere fact that you can form a mental image purporting to picture it”.43  
 
Perceptual imagination is not enough for conceivability. In order for the 
conceivability thesis to work, we must establish that we are imagining the right sort of 
image in order for us to be able to draw conclusions regarding possibility.
44
 This requires 
us to establish a way of distinguishing “mental images from which it is safe to infer 
possibility from those from which it is not”. 45 
 
 
4.4 Coherent Modal Imagination 
 
Ideally conceiving of something requires more than just conjuring up a mental 
image of that thing. A more reliable method of imagining might be coherent modal 
                                                 
40Ibid. Tidman’s examples include God’s being omnipotent, our possessing invisible souls, 2+2’s equalling 4, 
and gold’s having an atomic number of 79. 
41
I am indebted to John Bigelow for inspiring the use of Escher’s works as examples in this discussion. 
42
 Tidman, op. cit., p. 299. 
43
 Ibid. 
44
 Ibid. 
45
 Ibid. 
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imagination: that is, imagining a possible world in which something is the case. More 
formally, a person will use coherent modal imagination to imagine something when he or 
she “imagines a world... or a situation that verifies [that thing]” 46  and where further 
“reflection” 47 and “reasoning”48 about the imagined situation confirms it as a situation in 
which that thing is the case. 
 
Let us return to the example of the perpetual motion machine. In order to 
perceptually imagine this device we merely needed to conjure up a mental image of its 
operation. If we are to use coherent modal imagination however, we must imagine a much 
larger set of facts – that is, the set of facts which also explains how the machine operates. I 
might picture the components of the machine (say, a battery-powered motor which uses a 
dynamo to harness the kinetic energy of the motor to recharge its own batteries), the 
operation of the components (power flows from the batteries to the motor, the motor runs, 
the dynamo is turned, and power flows back to the batteries), and how the laws of nature 
must operate in a world in which such a machine works. It is in our attempts to imagine 
these facts that any underlying contradictions would become apparent. 
 
This seems to be exactly what we should expect from a test for possibility. To say 
that something is logically impossible is to say that there is no possible world in which that 
thing is the case. If we are capable of imagining a possible world in which that thing is the 
case (and we are doing so coherently), then it cannot be true that such a thing is logically 
impossible. 
 
 The conceivability (and thereby possibility) of Vincent’s time travel story depends 
on our ability to imagine coherently a possible world in which his journey takes place. In 
the next section I will argue that we are clearly able to do this. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
46
 Ibid. 
47
 Ibid, p. 152. 
48
 Chalmers (2002), op. cit., p. 153. 
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5. Coherently Imagining a Possible World in Which Vincent’s Story Takes Place 
  
 In order to conceive ideally of Vincent’s journey, we must be able to imagine a 
possible world in which four facts are true: 
 
1. Vincent and his time machine disappear at 12.00pm on Wednesday 1st January 
2020. 
2. Vincent and his time machine appear at 6.00pm on Wednesday 1st January 
2020. 
3. Upon appearing, Vincent is able to exit his time machine and physically interact 
with the world around him. 
4. Upon appearing, Vincent’s immediately prior experience is of having pressed 
the ‘On’ button in his time machine at 12.00pm on Wednesday 1st January 
2020. 
 
Coherently imagining a possible world in which Vincent’s story takes place 
requires more than just imagining these facts however. We must also be able to reflect on 
and reason about that situation. Indeed, it is the ability to do these things that distinguishes 
coherent modal imagination (coherently imagining a possible world in which Vincent’s 
story takes place) from mere perceptual imagination (conjuring up a mental image of 
Vincent’s story). 
 
There are two ways in which we can demonstrate our ability to imagine coherently 
a world in which Vincent’s story takes place. 
 
 
5.1 Immersing Ourselves in the Narrative 
 
Firstly, we can imagine coherently a world in which Vincent’s story takes place by 
immersing ourselves in the narrative of that story. Immersion requires more than merely 
understanding or picturing a story, it also involves engaging with the plot in a meaningful 
way. Immersion is the practice that allows us to understand a character’s motivations and 
become emotionally invested in their fate. Their concerns become our concerns, and our 
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interest in their welfare may even begin to resemble the sort of interest we have in those 
much closer to us, such as family or friends. Immersion is what happens when we become 
truly ‘caught up’ in a story. 
 
Immersion cannot occur where a narrative contains a blatant contradiction. We 
could not, for example, immerse ourselves in a story which involved a married bachelor, or 
a character that lived in a square house with only three walls. The sheer absurdity of these 
situations would prevent the audience from engaging with these plots in any meaningful 
sort of way. 
 
Can we immerse ourselves in Vincent’s story? 
 
I contend that we can. We might have some difficulty understanding Vincent’s 
motivations or becoming emotionally invested in his fate, but this is due to the limited facts 
of the story. Time travel writers can of course write bad time travel stories, and we cannot 
discount these stories as inconceivable simply because they are penned by an inept author. 
Perhaps, then, we should not look at whether we can immerse ourselves in a story, but 
rather whether that story describes a situation which could be the subject of a narrative in 
which we can immerse ourselves. 
 
In the case of Vincent’s story, any barriers to immersion are created merely by this 
author’s lack of skill at writing good science fiction, not by the fact that the story involves 
a case of time travel. Once properly fleshed out, the situation described in Vincent’s story 
could easily become the basis of a story in which readers could fully immerse themselves. 
We might write a new story in which Vincent’s journey is the realisation of a childhood 
dream or a short ‘test-flight’ preceding a much longer journey into the far future (perhaps 
in order to discover a remedy for the presently incurable ailment of a loved one). However 
we might choose to embellish this story, the fact that it is a time travel story will in no way 
prevent us from immersing ourselves in its narrative. 
 
The potential for us to immerse ourselves in Vincent’s story clearly demonstrates 
our ability to imagine coherently a possible world in which it takes place. This in turn 
provides good evidence for the conceivability, and thus possibility, of Vincent’s journey. 
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There is, however, a problem with immersability as a test for conceivability. This is 
the fact that we seem capable of immersing ourselves in the narratives of stories which are 
impossible. We have already discussed the clear contradictions in Back to the Future, yet 
despite this there seems to be nothing stopping us from becoming emotionally involved in 
Marty’s fate or understanding his desperation in wanting to have his parents reunited. It 
seems that we are just as capable of immersing ourselves in Marty’s story as we are in 
Vincent’s. 
 
But are we? I contend that we do not truly immerse ourselves in stories such as 
Marty’s. Instead, we immerse ourselves in these stories by deliberately ignoring certain 
contradictions. We feign immersion by saying “I won’t consider this” or “I’ll just pretend 
this makes sense”. This is not necessarily a bad thing. Sometimes this sort of suspension of 
disbelief is necessary in order to discuss interesting scenarios that we otherwise could not 
consider.  Feigned immersion is not good evidence for the conceivability of a story 
however. Instead, true immersion is required. This means engaging with a story without 
any reservations. 
 
 
5.2 Filling in Further Facts 
 
A second way we can imagine coherently a world in which Vincent’s story takes 
place is by filling in extra facts. Chalmers agrees that this is the key to coherent modal 
imagination, stating that “true coherence requires that arbitrary details can be filled in with 
no contradiction revealing itself on idealized reflection”.49 In order for something to be 
positively conceivable, it must be possible “to flesh out any missing details of an imagined 
situation that verifies [that thing], such that the details are imagined clearly and distinctly, 
and such that no contradiction is revealed”.50 
 
A story, then, is like a partially completed connect-the-dots picture. On this 
analogy, the facts explicitly given to the reader in the story represent those dots that have 
already been connected. In order to establish whether or not the story is capable of being 
                                                 
49
 Ibid. 
50
 Ibid.  
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coherently modally imagined, we must connect the remaining dots and see whether or not 
a consistent picture emerges. 
 
Vincent’s story stands up well to this analysis. We can clearly fill in extra facts in 
his story such that no contradiction reveals itself. We can, for example, fill in facts 
regarding what happened before his journey (what he had for breakfast and how he 
prepared for his impending journey). We can also continue his story, filling in facts 
regarding what happened after the completion of his journey (perhaps he mothballs his 
time travel project, satisfied that the device works effectively). 
 
Of course, the facts that we will most be expected to fill in are those facts which 
explain how the time machine works and where it is that Vincent goes between 12.00pm 
and 6.00pm. 
 
Providing an answer to the latter question is fairly straightforward. Vincent does 
not ‘go’ anywhere. One moment he is temporally located at 12.00pm, and the very next 
moment he is at 6.00pm. If he were to look out the window of his time machine as he 
pressed the ‘On’ button, he would see the hands of the clock on his garage wall jump 
instantaneously from 12.00pm to 6.00pm. Since Vincent skips over those six hours, he 
does not need to spend that time anywhere (or anywhen for that matter). 
 
Answering the question of how the time machine works is more challenging. We do 
not, however, need to give a specific description of how Vincent’s time machine works in 
order to successfully conceive of his story.
51
 I seem about as capable of explaining the 
mechanics of a time machine as I do the inner workings of my PC, but that does not 
prevent me from successfully conceiving of scenarios containing computers. All that we 
need to do in order to be able to conceive of Vincent’s journey is to imagine some possible 
world in which his journey occurs – a world in which a machine such as that described 
                                                 
51
 That is not to say that we could not provide such a description however. Physicists such as Ronald Mallett 
believe that they have sufficient evidence to describe how time travel can not only occur in some possible 
world, but even in this actual world. For further discussion of this, see Ronald Mallett and Bruce Henderson, 
Time Traveller – A Scientist’s Personal Mission to Make Time Travel a Reality (New York: Basic Books, 
2009). 
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does, by some contrivance, instantaneously
52
 transport Vincent six hours into the future. 
The specific mechanics of how this machine works are immaterial. 
 
This may sound suspiciously like the ‘faux-immersion’ criticised above: that is, a 
wilful ignorance of certain problems within the story. This is not what we are doing 
however. Omitting explanatory facts is quite different from turning a blind eye to blatant 
contradictions. While we may be required to do the former in order to conceive of 
Vincent’s journey, at no time are we required to do the latter. 
 
What facts, then, must be filled out in order for us to imagine coherently a possible 
world in which Vincent’s time travel journey occurs? Vincent must somehow disappear at 
12.00pm. Vincent must then also reappear at 6.00pm having experienced none of the 6 
hours between his times of disappearance and appearance. So long as there is a possible 
world in which these facts hold (as well as those facts demonstrating Vincent’s ability to 
physically interact with the world after his journey is complete), there will be a possible 
world in which time travel occurs. 
 
Imagining a possible world in which disappearances and reappearances occur 
should not be difficult. We regularly describe (and make sense of) stories containing 
disintegrations, apparitions or teletransportation, all of which require the disappearance 
and/or reappearance of certain things and persons. For this reason, we must be able to 
imagine coherently possible worlds in which these sorts of things occur. Imagining a 
possible world that contains the disappearance and reappearance of a man and a time 
machine should be no different. 
 
Perhaps the disappearance and reappearance of persons over time is different. It 
may be the case, depending on one’s particular view of time, that there is some extra 
concern regarding the conceivability of a time traveller disappearing now and reappearing 
later. On some views of time, the future has not happened yet, so the time traveller 
(apparently) has nowhere to go. This might be a problem that is specific to forwards time 
travel as in cases of backwards time travel the past is already there and so can be travelled 
to. This, however, is an objection arising from a confusion regarding how Vincent’s story 
                                                 
52
 That is, ‘instantaneously’ from Vincent’s perspective. 
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is told. The above would only be a problem if it was necessary for us to say something like 
“Vincent just disappeared at 12.00pm and now is at 6.00pm.”  This, however, is not the 
way in which Vincent’s story is described. Vincent and his machine disappear at 12.00pm 
and are not located anywhere or anywhen for the next six hours. Their journey does not 
require an already existing future for them to travel to. Instead, they simply reappear when 
6.00pm does arrive. Vincent and his machine avoid the problem outlined above by not 
arriving in the future until the future is already happening. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Vincent’s story contains a typical case of time travel. We can imagine a possible 
world in which Vincent’s story occurs and reflect on and reason about this world, as 
evidenced by our ability to immerse ourselves in the narrative and fill in extra facts in the 
story without any contradiction revealing itself. For this reason, Vincent’s story seems 
capable of coherent modal imagination and is therefore ideally conceivable. If we assume 
the truth of the conceivability thesis, then the conceivability of Vincent’s story also entails 
its possibility. This shows that at least some time travel journeys are logically possible. 
 
If any of the facts of Vincent’s story do lead to a contradiction, then it is up to the 
critic of time travel to demonstrate this. Like Chalmers, I believe that the ‘obviousness’ of 
what we are describing means that:
53
 
 
“...a certain burden of proof lies on those who claim that a given description is logically 
impossible. If someone truly believes that [something] is logically impossible, she must give 
us some idea of where a contradiction lies... If no reasonable analysis of the terms in 
question points toward a contradiction, or even makes the existence of a contradiction 
plausible, then there is a natural assumption in favour of logical possibility.”   
  
Many objections to the conceivability of Vincent’s journey will highlight problems 
with conceiving of his story occurring in this world (or some world very close to this 
world). They do not, however, go so far as to show that we cannot conceive of his story 
occurring in any possible world. The imagined world in which Vincent’s journey occurs 
                                                 
53
 Ibid., p. 97 
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might be subject to physical laws that are very different to those of our own world. It might 
be a very strange world indeed. However so long as we can conceive of Vincent’s journey 
occurring in some possible world, then it will not be the case that time travel is essentially 
inconsistent. 
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Chapter 2: Conceiving of Other Time Travel Journeys – 
Forwards Time Travel 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The conceivability thesis can be used to make a positive argument for the logical 
possibility of Vincent’s journey; however this story only describes one particular example 
of time travel. For this reason, the discussion above only serves to provide an argument for 
the logical possibility of one specific time travel journey (or a journey very similar to it). 
Nevertheless, this argument remains philosophically interesting, as it allows us to rebut 
claims that time travel is essentially inconsistent. 
 
Many philosophers do not argue that time travel is essentially inconsistent. Instead, 
they merely allege that certain kinds of time travel are inconsistent. They might, for 
example, accept the consistency of forwards time travel journeys whilst denying the 
possibility of backwards time travel journeys. Arguments such as the Changing-the-Past 
Objection and the Grandfather Paradox do exactly this. There are many facts in Vincent’s 
time travel story that could have been different, and it is unclear whether or not his story 
would have remained ideally conceivable if these facts had been altered. In the following 
two chapters I will make modifications to Vincent’s story in order to show that the 
conceivability thesis can be used to make a positive argument for the logical possibility of 
other kinds of time travel. In Chapters 4 and 5 I will discuss how the conceivability of each 
of these different kinds of time travel has different implications for which metaphysical 
views we choose to adopt. 
 
 
2. Distinguishing Between Different Kinds of Time Travel Journeys 
 
All time travel journeys fall into one of four categories. We can identify these 
categories by distinguishing between time travel journeys in two different ways. 
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2.1 Distinguishing Time Travel Journeys by Direction 
 
The most obvious way in which we can distinguish a time travel journey is by its 
direction. A time travel journey can be either a journey forward in time or a journey 
backward in time. A forwards time travel journey will take the time traveller to some point 
in time later than their point of departure, while a backwards time travel journey will take 
them to some point in time earlier than their point of departure. Earlier we identified p as 
the period of time travelled by the time traveller during a time travel journey. A time travel 
journey will be a forwards time travel journey where p > 0. In contrast, a time travel 
journey will be a backwards time travel journey where p < 0. 
 
In Vincent’s story, p is 6 hours. Vincent’s journey is therefore a forwards time 
travel journey. 
 
 
2.2 Distinguishing Time Travel Journeys by Duration 
 
Time travel journeys can also be distinguished by their duration. A time travel 
journey can either be instantaneous (taking no time at all) or gradual (taking some amount 
of time). Earlier we identified d as the duration of the time traveller’s journey from the 
perspective of the time traveller. A time travel journey will be instantaneous where d = 0. 
This is the sort of time travel seen in the films Back to the Future and Los Cronocrímenes 
(Timecrimes).
54
 A time travel journey will be gradual where d > 0. This is the sort of time 
travel seen in H.G. Wells’ The Time Machine55 and the film Primer.56 
 
In Vincent’s story, d is 0. Vincent’s journey is therefore an instantaneous time 
travel journey. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
54
 Los Cronocrímenes (Timecrimes), Dir. Nacho Vigalondo, Karbo Vantas Entertainment, 2007. 
55
 H.G. Wells, The Time Machine (London: Penguin Group, 2005). 
56
 Primer, Dir. Shane Carruth, THINKFilm, 2004. 
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2.3 Different Kinds of Time Travel 
 
By combining these two distinctions we can identify four different categories of 
time travel: 
 
1. Instantaneous forwards time travel; 
2. Gradual forwards time travel; 
3. Instantaneous backwards time travel; and 
4. Gradual backwards time travel. 
 
Vincent’s journey (a case of instantaneous forwards time travel) represents only 
one of these four categories. 
 
In the next two chapters I will consider the conceivability of each of these 
categories of time travel. In order to do this, I will assume that Vincent’s initial story 
(hereafter referred to as VS1) is ideally conceivable. I will then begin to make alterations 
to Vincent’s story and reassess whether or not its conceivability remains. I will show that 
there are several categories of time travel which are ideally conceivable. In doing so, I will 
use the conceivability thesis to provide a positive argument for the logical possibility of a 
number of different kinds of time travel. 
 
 
3. Conceiving of Instantaneous Forwards Time Travel Journeys 
 
The first category of time travel I will consider is instantaneous forwards time 
travel. This kind of time travel occurs whenever a time traveller finds him or herself 
instantaneously transported to some point in time later than his or her time of departure. 
 
Vincent’s journey is a typical case of instantaneous forwards time travel. Vincent’s 
journey is also ideally conceivable. If we can conceive ideally of an instantaneous time 
travel journey six hours into the future, then we are just as capable of ideally conceiving of 
an instantaneous time travel journey of any other length. In order to demonstrate this, 
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suppose we altered the facts of Vincent’s story so that it read as follows (facts altered from 
VS1 appear in bold): 
 
VS2: Vincent has built a time machine. Vincent steps into the machine at 12.00pm on 
Wednesday 1
st
 January 2020. He sets the destination time on the machine’s control panel to 
“6.00pm Monday 1st January 2120” and presses the ‘On’ button. The machine 
disappears. At 6.00pm on Monday 1
st
 January 2120 the machine reappears. The 
physical processes going on within Vincent and the time machine are now exactly as they 
would have been immediately after Vincent pressed the ‘On’ button at 12.00pm if he had 
not in fact pressed the button. Vincent exits the time machine (conveniently located in his 
garage) and goes into his living room. Once there, he makes a cup of tea and turns on the 
television to watch the six o’clock news. 
 
In order to conceive ideally of VS2, we must once again be capable of coherently 
imagining a possible world in which the story takes place. As with VS1, this boils down to 
our ability to imagine a world in which four specific facts are true, each of which is 
required in order for the story to be describing a genuine case of instantaneous forwards 
time travel: 
 
1. Vincent and his time machine disappear at 12.00pm on Wednesday 1st January 
2020. 
2. Vincent and his time machine appear at 6.00pm on Monday 1st January 2120. 
3. Upon appearing, Vincent is able exit his time machine and physically interact 
with the world around him. 
4. Upon appearing, Vincent’s immediately prior experience is of having pressed 
the ‘On’ button in his time machine at 12.00pm on Wednesday 1st January 
2020. 
 
The only difference between these facts and the facts of VS1 is the time and date of 
Vincent’s appearance. When discussing VS1, we found that we had no problem with 
imagining a possible world in which persons disappeared and appeared. We demonstrated 
our ability to imagine such a world coherently by showing that (1) Vincent’s story was 
capable of forming the basis of a narrative in which we could become fully immersed, and 
(2) we could fill in extra facts in the story without any contradiction revealing itself. 
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The same remains true of VS2. The specific time of Vincent’s appearance has no 
bearing on our ability to conceive ideally of his journey. If we can imagine coherently a 
world in which Vincent disappears and appears at some temporal distance (as we did in 
VS1), then we can continue to do this whatever that temporal distance might be.  
 
As evidence of this, VS2 is just as capable as VS1 of forming the basis of a 
narrative in which we could become fully immersed. We can illustrate this via an analogy 
with journeys through space. This is not to say that time and space are analogous (though 
this is the view the four-dimensionalist would take), but rather that journeys – be they 
through space, time, or any other dimension – are analogous. All journeys have 
beginnings, ends, lengths, and durations. There are also many things which we can say 
about journeys through space which we can also say about journeys through other 
dimensions. It will always be impossible, for example, for one journey to be longer than 
another when both journeys are of the exact same length. 
 
Suppose that we established that we were capable of fully immersing ourselves in a 
particular story about spatial travel. In this story, the traveller (whom we shall call Harold) 
drives from Wellington to New Plymouth. Suppose, then, that we wished to alter the length 
of his journey, so that it now ends in Auckland. Does doing this affect our ability to fully 
immerse ourselves in his story? Clearly, it does not. No new element has been added to the 
story which thwarts our immersion, nor are we suddenly required to willfully ignore some 
particular inconsistency in the narrative. The same is true of instantaneous time travel. If 
VS1 can form the basis of a story in which we can become fully immersed, then so too can 
an instantaneous time travel journey of any other length. 
 
We are also still able to fill in extra facts in VS2 without any contradiction 
revealing itself. There may be some difficulties; how, for example, do we know that 
Vincent’s home will still be standing in one hundred years time? How do we know that the 
6 o’clock news will still exist? This is not a problem for our ability to imagine coherently a 
case of instantaneous forwards time travel however, as all we must do is imagine a world 
in which this is the case. Further, what Vincent does upon exiting his time-machine is 
incidental. You will recall that the only reason these facts were included in the first place 
was to clarify that Vincent was capable of physically interacting with the world around him 
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upon his arrival in the future (a necessary requirement of genuine time travel). All that is 
needed is that Vincent does something upon exiting his time machine – it doesn’t really 
matter what it is. So long as we can imagine coherently a possible world in which this 
happens, then the instantaneous time travel journey simpliciter remains ideally 
conceivable. 
 
It does not matter whether a time traveller travels six hours into the future, or six 
centuries into the future. If we can conceive ideally of Vincent’s first time travel journey, 
then we can conceive ideally of any instantaneous forwards time travel journey. Assuming 
the truth of the conceivability thesis, this also shows that all instantaneous forwards time 
travel journeys are logically possible. 
 
 
4. Conceiving of Gradual Forwards Time Travel Journeys 
 
The second category of time travel I will consider is gradual forwards time travel. 
This kind of time travel occurs whenever a time traveller finds him or herself transported 
to some point in time later than his or her time of departure, but takes some amount of time 
get there. Think of the Doctor walking around in his TARDIS while he journeys towards 
the future, or the time traveller in The Time Machine watching the world change around 
him as the days click by. We can alter Vincent’s story so that it too describes a case of 
gradual forwards time travel (facts altered from VS1 appear in bold): 
 
VS3: Vincent has built a time machine. Vincent steps into the machine at 12.00pm on 
Wednesday 1
st
 January 2020. He sets the destination time on the machine’s control panel to 
“6.00pm Wednesday 1st January 2020” and presses the ‘On’ button. The machine 
disappears. At 6.00pm that same day the machine reappears. The physical processes going 
on within Vincent and the time machine are now exactly as they would have been 
thirty minutes after Vincent pressed the ‘On’ button at 12.00pm if he had not in fact 
pressed the button.  Vincent and his time machine have undergone thirty minutes of 
normal causal processes since the button was pressed. Vincent exits the time machine 
(conveniently located in his garage) and goes into his living room. Once there, he makes a 
cup of tea and turns on the television to watch the six o’clock news. 
33 
 
 Does changing Vincent’s story from a case of instantaneous forwards time travel to 
a case of gradual forwards time travel affect its conceivability? In order for us to conceive 
ideally of this story, we must once again be capable of coherently imagining a possible 
world in which four facts are true. 
 
1. Vincent and his time machine disappear at 12.00pm on Wednesday 1st January 
2020. 
2. Vincent and his time machine appear at 6.00pm on Wednesday 1st January 
2020. 
3. Upon appearing, Vincent is able to exit his time machine and physically interact 
with the world around him. 
4. Upon appearing, Vincent and his time machine have undergone thirty minutes 
of normal causal processes since the ‘On’ button was pressed at 12.00pm on 
Wednesday 1
st
 January 2020. 
 
The only difference between these facts and the facts of VS1 is what has happened 
to Vincent and his time machine prior to appearing. Can we still imagine coherently a 
possible world in which this story takes place? 
 
There is no reason why the duration of Vincent’s journey should affect the ability 
of the story to form the basis of a narrative in which we could fully immerse ourselves. 
Recall the analogy of Harold’s spatial journey. If changing the point of Vincent’s 
appearance is like changing the final destination of Harold’s journey, then changing the 
duration of Vincent’s journey is like changing the duration of Harold’s journey. How long 
Harold takes to get from Wellington to Auckland has no bearing on our ability to immerse 
ourselves in that story. Likewise, how long Vincent takes to get from 12.00pm to 6.00pm 
has no bearing on our ability to immerse ourselves in this story. Changing the temporal 
length of a spatial journey may affect the plausibility of a story (say, if Harold managed to 
complete the entire journey in mere seconds), but this does not preclude us from 
immersing ourselves in the narrative. There are many implausible science fiction stories 
that we are nevertheless capable of fully immersing ourselves in. 
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The difficulty for gradual forwards time travel arises when we try to fill in extra 
facts in the story. Suppose that we wanted to describe Vincent’s experiences during his 
journey. Where and when do these experiences take place? 
 
 
4.1 Journeying Forwards Outside of Time and Space 
 
One solution might be to simply say that Vincent and his time machine are nowhere 
and nowhen during their journey. They are journeying outside of time and space. There is 
nothing conceptually problematic about an entity ceasing to have a spatio-temporal 
location. The same phenomenon occurs in cases of instantaneous time travel (recall VS1, 
where Vincent and his time machine are also without a spatial or temporal location 
between the times of 12.00pm and 6.00pm). Indeed, people and objects lack spatio-
temporal locations all the time – both before they are created and after they are destroyed. 
What is conceptually problematic for cases of gradual time travel is that something 
happens to the object during the period that it is without a location. This is what I shall 
refer to as the No-Location Problem. 
 
In VS1 we did not need to fill in any facts regarding where and when Vincent was 
located during his journey. This was because the journey was instantaneous. Vincent 
simply did not exist during the journey, and therefore did not need to go anywhere. Put in 
terms of person-stages, one of Vincent’s person-stages existed at 12.00pm as he pressed 
the ‘On’ button. His very next person-stage existed at 6.00pm just as he removed his finger 
from the ‘On’ button. Vincent had no person stages located between 12.00pm and 6.00pm, 
so these person stages did not need to be spatially or temporally located. 
 
The same solution cannot be given with a case of gradual time travel. In the above 
story Vincent departs from 12.00pm and takes thirty minutes to reach his destination of 
6.00pm that same day. During this thirty minute period the time traveller and his time 
machine continue to undergo a number of ordinary causal processes. Vincent’s neurons 
fire, his body ages and his stomach continues to digest his last meal. Likewise, around him 
his machine undergoes certain changes. The clock on the control panel ticks away 
normally, and the machine continues to degrade in the same way as any other machine 
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might – the pipes rust, the rubber valves become brittle (albeit imperceptibly during such a 
short space of time). 
 
If we are to imagine coherently a possible world in which such a story takes place, 
we must be able to fill in facts regarding where and when these events occur. But how can 
we do this? The time traveller is no longer located at 12.00pm, nor has he yet arrived at 
6.00pm. His disappearance upon pressing the ‘On’ button also makes it clear that he is not 
located at any particular spatio-temporal point between 12.00pm and 6.00pm. 
 
 Consider an analogous case. Imagine that an orchestra is playing a performance of 
Tchaikovsky’s 1812 Overture. Part-way through this performance the orchestra pauses, 
waits 5 minutes, then resumes playing. Such an occurrence is analogous to a case of 
instantaneous time travel. Just as the time traveller and his time machine can be without a 
spatio-temporal location for some period of time, so too can a particular performance of 
Tchaikovsky. Consider, however, what we would make of a case where the orchestra 
resumes playing having already played an additional minute of the song. That is not to say 
that they have skipped a minute of the song, nor have they sneakily played that minute 
during a period of inattentiveness by the audience. The additional minute has been played, 
but not at any specific place or time. 
 
 This is essentially what is occurring in VS3. Something happens, but it does not 
happen in any specific place or time. Such an occurrence is nonsensical, and provides an 
incredibly large stumbling block for our ability to imagine coherently a possible world in 
which such a story takes place. 
 
We can include additional facts in VS3 to further highlight this problem. Consider 
the following (facts altered from VS3 appear in bold): 
 
VS3*: Vincent has built a time machine. Vincent steps into the machine at 12.00pm on 
Wednesday 1
st
 January 2020 and sets the alarm on his wristwatch to go off in 15 
minutes time. He sets the destination time on the machine’s control panel to “6.00pm 
Wednesday 1
st
 January 2020” and presses the ‘On’ button. The machine disappears. At 
6.00pm that same day the machine reappears. The physical processes going on within 
Vincent and the time machine are now exactly as they would have been thirty minutes after 
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Vincent pressed the ‘On’ button at 12.00pm if he had not in fact pressed the button.  
Vincent and his time machine have undergone thirty minutes of normal causal processes 
since the button was pressed. Vincent’s wristwatch alarm sounded 15 minutes into the 
journey. Vincent exits the time machine (conveniently located in his garage) and goes into 
his living room. Once there, he makes a cup of tea and turns on the television to watch the 
six o’clock news. 
 
 Where and when did Vincent’s wristwatch alarm go off? We cannot fill in this 
particular fact, and therefore cannot imagine coherently a possible world in which VS3 
occurs. 
 
 
4.2 Journeying Forwards Through Time and Space 
 
We can, however, modify VS3 in an attempt to make it ideally conceivable. In 
order to solve the No-Location Problem, we must make it so everything that happens to 
Vincent and his time machine does so at some spatio-temporal location. This is best done 
by making Vincent journey through time and space, as opposed to outside of it. We can do 
this by altering his story so that the time-machine no longer disappears, but instead stays 
physically present throughout the journey (facts altered from VS3* appear in bold): 
 
VS4: Vincent has built a time machine. Vincent steps into the machine at 12.00pm on 
Wednesday 1
st
 January 2020 and sets the alarm on his wristwatch to go off in 15 minutes 
time. He sets the destination time on the machine’s control panel to “6.00pm Wednesday 1st 
January 2020” and presses the ‘On’ button. The machine stays where it is. At 6.00pm that 
same day the physical processes going on within Vincent and the time machine are now 
exactly as they would have been thirty minutes after Vincent pressed the ‘On’ button at 
12.00pm if he had not in fact pressed the button.  Vincent and his time machine have 
undergone thirty minutes of normal causal processes since the button was pressed. 
Vincent’s wristwatch alarm sounded 15 minutes into the journey. Vincent exits the time 
machine (conveniently located in his garage) and goes into his living room. Once there, he 
makes a cup of tea and turns on the television to watch the six o’clock news. 
 
 This alteration makes it clear that the physical processes going on within the time 
machine during its journey (including the sounding of the wristwatch alarm) all occur in 
the space where the time machine is located. 
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 But this still leaves the question of when events within the time machine occur.  
 
One solution might be as follows: If the alarm goes off halfway through the thirty-
minute duration of the journey, then it stands to reason that this will happen halfway 
through the six-hour period of time that is being travelled. That is, at 3.00pm. This is a 
risky move however, as it invites the question of whether or not we are still conceiving of a 
case of genuine time travel. If Vincent is temporally located at 3.00pm fifteen minutes into 
his journey, then this seems to mean that he will be temporally located at 4.00pm twenty 
minutes into his journey, 5.00pm twenty-five minutes into his journey and finally 6.00pm 
thirty minutes into his journey. Why is this problematic? Consider a similar story (facts 
altered from VS4 appear in bold): 
 
VS5: Vincent has built a suspended animation machine. Vincent steps into the machine 
at 12.00pm on Wednesday 1
st
 January 2020 and sets the alarm on his wristwatch to go off 
in 15 minutes time. He sets the ‘Suspension’ on the machine’s control panel to “1/12 
normal rate for a period of six hours” and presses the ‘On’ button.  The machine stays 
where it is. At 6.00pm that same day the physical processes going on within Vincent and 
the suspended animation machine are now exactly as they would have been thirty 
minutes after Vincent pressed the ‘On’ button at 12.00pm if he had not in fact pressed the 
button.  Vincent and his suspended animation machine have undergone thirty minutes of 
normal causal processes since the button was pressed. Vincent’s wristwatch alarm sounded 
15 minutes into the journey. Vincent exits the suspended animation machine 
(conveniently located in his garage) and goes into his living room. Once there, he makes a 
cup of tea and turns on the television to watch the six o’clock news. 
 
 In VS5 we have a story of a suspended animation machine – that is, a machine 
which can slow or halt physical processes. VS5 is not a time travel story, as there is no 
discrepancy between the duration of the journey and the distance being travelled. Vincent 
is physically present at every moment between 12.00pm and 6.00pm. During this time 
Vincent progresses forward through time just as every other individual does. The only 
difference is that Vincent experiences less as this progression occurs (for every hour of 
time the rest of the world experiences, Vincent experiences only five minutes). His story is 
no different from the story of an individual who slips into some sort of hibernation. 
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 The problem for the conceivability of gradual time travel is that the important 
features of VS5 are identical to those of VS4. Indeed, the only difference between the two 
stories is the name given to Vincent’s machine. How then, can we be sure that what we are 
conceiving of in VS4 is in fact a case of time travel and not of something else such as 
suspended animation? It seems that once we alter the story to provide a solution to the No-
Location Problem (as we did from VS3 to VS4) we are left with a story which no longer 
describes a case of genuine time travel. Put simply, we may very well be capable of ideally 
conceiving of Vincent’s story in VS4, but what we are conceiving of is not a time travel 
story. 
 
 
4.3 Re-evaluating ‘Genuine’ Time Travel 
 
 It is clear that whatever is happening in VS4, it is the very same kind of thing as 
that which happens in VS5. Our intuitive response is to hold that neither VS4 nor VS5 
describes a case of genuine time travel, but there is an alternative. We could instead argue 
that both stories are in fact time travel stories. That is, we could argue that Vincent’s 
journey in the suspended animation machine in VS5 does amount to time travel. 
 
 In the TV series Futurama, Phillip J. Fry accidentally enters a suspended animation 
machine and finds himself frozen for one thousand years.
57
 For Fry, this time passes in an 
instant. Surely such a journey should be considered time travel? Fry has journeyed into the 
actual future, he is capable of physically interacting with the world around him, and there 
seems to be a clear discrepancy between how much time he has experienced (zero seconds) 
and the period of time he has traversed (one thousand years). To any bystander, it seems 
that Fry has experienced exactly what Marty McFly would have experienced had he set the 
controls of his time machine for a one thousand year journey into the future. 
 
 Alas, Fry’s journey is still very different to Marty’s. It is true that there seems to be 
a time discrepancy in the case of Fry’s journey into the future. Likewise, in VS5 there 
appears to be a discrepancy between the duration of Vincent’s journey (thirty minutes) and 
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the period of time he has traversed (six hours). These are not, however, the sorts of time 
discrepancies that are necessary for a case of genuine time travel. Experiencing time faster 
is not the same as experiencing a time discrepancy. In order to illustrate this, it is useful to 
once again draw an analogy with spatial journeys. 
 
 Imagine that before setting off on his journey to Auckland, Harold claims he will 
carry out the journey by ‘space travelling’. He explains that space travelling is, by 
definition, travelling in such a way that there is a discrepancy between the spatial length of 
a traveller’s journey and the spatial distance that he traverses. Someone who space travels 
is therefore able to travel to other locations very quickly by ‘skipping over’ some of the 
distance between their points of departure and arrival. Harold gets into his car and 
commences his journey from Wellington to Auckland – a distance of approximately 493 
kilometres. At the same time, a number of other travellers set out on the same journey, 
though these travellers intend to use far more traditional means of transportation. A few 
hours later, Harold arrives in Auckland. Harold has duly beaten all of the other travellers to 
their destination. Indeed, Harold has completed the journey in record time. Despite this 
however, the odometer on Harold’s car reads as having travelled 493 kilometres since 
leaving Wellington. As the other travellers arrive, he notes that their odometers display this 
same distance. 
 
Is Harold a genuine space traveller? Or has he merely travelled from Wellington to 
Auckland at an incredibly fast speed? 
 
 Clearly, Harold is not a space traveller. There is no discrepancy between the spatial 
length of his journey (493 kilometres) and the spatial distance he has travelled (493 
kilometres). Harold may have succeeded in travelling from Wellington to Auckland faster 
than anyone else, but he has nevertheless passed through every kilometer along the way. 
Fry – and Vincent from VS5 – are exactly the same. Although they may get to some future 
point “faster” than anyone else, they nevertheless pass through every point in time along 
the way. The way in which Fry and Vincent move forward through time is exactly the 
same way in which I move through time now as I sit at my desk typing. The only 
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difference is the rate at which they do this. D.H. Mellor agrees with this position, arguing 
that:
 58
 
 
What is called forward time travel is neither a problematic nor an especially remarkable 
phenomenon. To call it that is simply to give a misleadingly portentous description of 
situations in which our mental and bodily processes take longer than they normally do. 
 
Gradual forwards time travel through time and space is not time travel at all – it is 
simply a sped-up version of what each of us does on an everyday basis. 
  
 This revelation holds ramifications for a number of popular time travel stories. In 
The Time Machine, the time traveller travels to the future in exactly the same way as 
Vincent in VS4. If our conclusion is correct, then the time traveller in this story is not in 
fact time travelling, but merely slowing down the physical processes of himself, his 
machine, and everything else within its field of effect.
59
 This argument also poses 
problems for the possibility of time travel under Albert Einstein’s Special Theory of 
Relativity. The theory dictates that objects travelling at different speeds will experience 
time at different rates.
60
 Put simply, the faster you go, the slower time passes. Empirical 
observation has confirmed this effect, and been used as evidence for the actual occurrence 
of (albeit very small) cases of forwards time travel.
61
 If our conclusion is correct, however, 
then these observations do not provide evidence for the possibility of time travel. However 
fast an object or person might travel, this will never cause them to experience a time 
discrepancy. They may experience time more quickly than anyone else, but they will 
nevertheless journey through every point in time along the way. They are not time 
travellers. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
Instantaneous forwards time travel is ideally conceivable. If we can imagine 
coherently a possible world in which Vincent’s first story (VS1) occurs, then we can 
imagine coherently a possible world in which any case of instantaneous forwards time 
travel occurs, regardless of the period of time being traversed. Assuming the truth of the 
conceivability thesis, this means that instantaneous forwards time travel journeys are 
logically possible. 
 
 Ideally conceiving of gradual forwards time travel is more difficult. The No-
Location problem means that we cannot conceive of such journeys if the time traveller and 
his machine do not remain physically present throughout their journey. If, however, they 
are physically present throughout their journey, then the story becomes conceivable, but 
fails to be a story of time travel. We cannot, therefore, conceive ideally of a case of gradual 
forwards time travel. While this does not necessarily demonstrate the impossibility of such 
journeys, it does prevent us from putting forward a positive argument for their logical 
possibility based upon the conceivability thesis. 
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Chapter 3: Conceiving of Other Time Travel Journeys – 
Backwards Time Travel 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the previous two chapters I have put forward a positive argument for the logical 
possibility of forwards time travel. I have argued that all instantaneous forwards time travel 
journeys are ideally conceivable and (assuming the truth of the conceivability thesis) 
logically possible. I will now turn to consider the conceivability of backwards time travel 
journeys. 
 
 
2. Sidestepping the Usual Objections to the Possibility of Backwards Time Travel 
 
The logical possibility of backwards time travel is ordinarily considered more 
contentious than that of forwards time travel. As noted above, it is argued that certain 
scientific theories and empirical observations provide evidence for the physical – and thus 
also logical – possibility of journeys into the future.62 
 
I have argued that journeys of this kind do not count as genuine cases of time 
travel, most notably because they fail to meet the time discrepancy requirement. Despite 
this, however, these sorts of journeys are something very much like genuine forwards time 
travel. Their physical possibility at the very least serves to make the logical possibility of 
genuine forwards time travel journeys (that is, forwards time travel journeys which are 
instantaneous) far more palatable. If any contradiction were to arise out of a genuine case 
of forwards time travel, then it seems that this same contradiction should arise out of the 
sort of journeys into the future that the Special Theory of Relativity already allows us to 
make. The fact that no such contradictions arise is good news for the logical possibility of 
genuine forwards time travel. 
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A second reason that the possibility of backwards time travel is usually seen as 
more contentious than the possibility of forwards time travel is that there a number of very 
powerful arguments which apply to the former, but not the latter. One of the most 
notorious of these objections (and one which I discussed above with reference to Marty’s 
journey in Back to the Future)
63
 focuses on the impossibility of changing the past. This 
argument can be stated as follows: 
 
1. If backwards time travel is possible, then it is possible to change the past. 
2. Changing the past is logically impossible. 
Therefore, 
3. Backwards time travel is logically impossible. 
 
The second premise of this argument is clearly true. The past cannot be changed. 
To suggest that we can change the past is to hold that something both can and cannot be 
the case at the same point in time (like Marty’s parents both meeting and not meeting in 
1955). Statements such as this are clearly contradictory. 
 
Where the argument goes wrong is in its confusion of the logical possibility of a 
backwards time travel journey with the logical possibility of certain actions that the time 
traveller tries to carry out upon arriving in the past. Put simply, the changing-the-past 
objection argues that if a time traveller travels to the past and tries to do something 
impossible, then backwards time travel must be impossible. But this simply does not 
follow. Consider an analogous case. Suppose that I tried to demonstrate the logical 
impossibility of travelling from Wellington to Auckland by retelling Harold’s story in the 
following way: 
 
Harold travels by car from Wellington to Auckland. Upon arriving in Auckland he sits 
down with a pen and paper and draws a three-sided square. 
 
It does not make sense to say that Harold’s attempt to do something logically 
impossible upon arriving at his destination necessarily renders the preceding journey 
logically impossible. Harold’s journey is still possible, even though what he attempts to do 
                                                 
63
 See above at page 12. 
44 
 
upon arriving at his destination is not. Something will stop Harold from drawing that 
shape, but it need not be the failure of his journey. So too is it with backwards time travel. 
Something will prevent the time traveller from changing the past,
64
 but there is no reason 
why that thing will be the necessary failure of his backwards time travel journey. 
 
In order for the changing-the-past objection to avoid the above confusion, it must 
be changed to the following: 
 
1. If a backwards time travel journey is possible, then it is possible to change the 
past. 
2. Changing the past is logically impossible. 
Therefore, 
3. Backwards time travel is logically impossible. 
 
In doing this, however, it becomes clear that the first premise is false. The 
possibility of a backwards time travel journey no more entails the possibility of changing 
the past than the possibility of a journey from Wellington to Auckland entails the 
possibility of drawing a three-sided square. The possibility of a backwards time travel 
journey merely entails the possibility of departing from the present, and arriving at some 
time in the past.  
 
In this chapter I will focus only on the ideal conceivability of backwards time travel 
journeys. There may be many impossible things that a time traveller is incapable of doing 
upon arriving in the past, but all that I wish to prove is that getting there is logically 
possible. 
 
 
3. Conceiving of Instantaneous Backwards Time Travel Journeys 
 
The first kind of time travel I will consider is instantaneous backwards time travel. 
This kind of time travel occurs whenever a time traveller finds him or herself 
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instantaneously transported to some point in time earlier than his or her time of departure. 
Once again, we can amend the facts of Vincent’s story so that it describes such a journey 
(facts altered from VS1 are in bold):  
 
VS6: Vincent has built a time machine. Vincent steps into the machine at 12.00pm on 
Wednesday January 1
st
 2020. He sets the destination time on the machine’s control panel to 
“6.00am Wednesday January 1st 2020” and presses the ‘On’ button. The machine 
disappears. At 6.00am Wednesday January 1
st
 2020 the machine appears. The physical 
processes going on within Vincent and the time machine are now exactly as they would be 
immediately after Vincent presses the ‘On’ button at 12.00pm if he does not in fact press 
the button. Vincent exits the time machine (conveniently located in his garage) and goes 
into his living room. Once there, he makes a cup of tea and turns on the television. 
 
In order to conceive ideally of this story, we must once again be capable of 
coherently imagining a possible world in which four facts hold. 
 
1. Vincent and his time machine disappear at 12.00pm on Wednesday January 1st 
2020. 
2. Vincent and his time machine appear at 6.00am Wednesday January 1st 2020 
3. Upon appearing, Vincent is able to exit his machine and physically interact with 
the world around him. 
4. Upon appearing, Vincent’s immediately prior experience is of having pressed 
the ‘On’ button in his time machine, and this event occurred at 12.00pm on 
Wednesday January 1
st
 2020. 
 
These are, incidentally, very similar to the four facts that we had to imagine when 
conceiving of Vincent’s first story. The only difference now is the temporal order in which 
these events occur. Does this make any difference to our ability to conceive ideally of the 
story? 
 
We clearly have no problem imagining a world in which each of these four facts is 
separately true. As demonstrated in previous chapters, there is no difficulty in imagining a 
man with certain experiences, or a man who is capable of physically interacting with the 
world around him. We can also easily imagine disappearances and appearances, and we 
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can imagine these happening at some temporal distance. What, then, is to stop us from 
imagining these events occurring in an unusual order? To be clear, in VS1 our ability to 
imagine Vincent’s disappearance was not reliant on his appearance at some later time. We 
could just as easily have conceived of Vincent merely disappearing without a following 
appearance. Likewise, our ability to imagine Vincent’s appearance did not seem to rely on 
a prior disappearance. Consider, for example, a truncated account of Vincent’s first story: 
 
At 6.00pm on Wednesday 1
st
 January 2020 Vincent and his time machine appear. Upon 
appearing, Vincent’s immediately prior experience is of having pressed the ‘On’ button in 
his time machine at 12.00pm on Wednesday January 1
st
 2020 Vincent exits the time 
machine (conveniently located in his garage) and goes into his living room. Once there, he 
makes a cup of tea and turns on the television to watch the six o’clock news. 
 
 We do not need any more information in order to be capable of imagining a 
possible world in which this story takes place, nor do we need to check that this 
appearance was preceded by a disappearance. The story might be unusual without some 
prior disappearance, but it is certainly not unimaginable. Consider what happens if we 
make the following alteration: 
 
At 6.00am on Wednesday 1
st
 January 2020 Vincent and his time machine appear. Upon 
appearing, Vincent’s immediately prior experience is of having pressed the ‘On’ button in 
his time machine at 12.00pm on Wednesday January 1
st
 2020. Vincent exits the time 
machine (conveniently located in his garage) and goes into his living room. Once there, he 
makes a cup of tea and turns on the television. 
 
 Do we need to check that this appearance is followed by a disappearance? We do 
not. Once again, a later disappearance will make more sense of this appearance, but it is 
certainly not necessary in order for us to be able to imagine a possible world in which this 
series of events occurs. Neither disappearances nor appearances rely on a specific temporal 
ordering in order to be imaginable. For this reason, we should have no difficulty in 
imaging a world in which an appearance is followed by a disappearance. 
 
 We can therefore imagine a possible world in which VS7 takes place. Can we 
imagine such a world coherently however? 
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If we assume that VS1 is capable of forming the basis of a story in which we could 
fully immerse ourselves, then it seems difficult to see how merely changing the order of 
Vincent’s disappearance and appearance could suddenly prevent us from becoming 
immersed. We can still fill in extra facts without a contradiction revealing itself. We can, in 
fact, fill in the very same facts we were able to fill in for VS1. Vincent’s journey is still 
instantaneous, so we are not required to explain where (or when) he goes during his 
journey. We might create a contradiction by filling in facts regarding what Vincent does 
after his journey (he might, for example, stop himself from travelling back in time in the 
first place), but as discussed above, this does not affect the conceivability of his journey, 
but rather the conceivability of what Vincent tries to do upon arriving in the past. 
 
 Indeed, as with instantaneous forwards time travel, it seems that we can even 
change the period of time travelled without affecting our ability to imagine coherently a 
world in which the story takes place. It matters very little whether Vincent journeys back in 
time six hours, six days, or six centuries. 
 
It is true that we could select a destination (both spatial and temporal) where 
Vincent did not appear. We could, for example, send Vincent back in time five minutes 
despite knowing that no time machine appeared at this time. Such a story is an unfair move 
however, and bears striking similarities to those stories in which time travellers arrive in 
the past only to attempt some impossible feat. Arriving at a temporal location where you 
never arrived is logically impossible, but this is a trivial inconsistency. Any journey can be 
rendered unimaginable by including a contradiction such as this. Consider again Harold’s 
story, and suppose that we told it as follows: 
 
Harold travels by car from Wellington to Auckland. He arrives at a destination at which he 
does not arrive. 
 
Such a story is clearly inconceivable, but that is exactly what we would expect. The 
inconceivability of this contradictory story does not provide us with any interesting insight 
into the possibility of journeys from Wellington to Auckland. The same is true of 
backwards time travel. It is, of course, impossible for someone to arrive at a temporal 
location where they never arrived, but this is no more a limitation on the possibility of 
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backwards time travel than the impossibility of someone arriving at a spatial location 
where they never arrived is a limitation on spatial travel. To tell a story in which a time 
traveller goes somewhere they do not – and then hold this out as proof of the impossibility 
of backwards time travel – is to unfairly import a contradiction into the story from the get-
go. It is, for this very reason, a bad argument. 
 
Any backwards time travel story which describes a time traveller travelling to 
somewhere he never went will always be inconceivable,
65
 but this tells us nothing about 
the possibility of instantaneous backwards time travel journeys. All stories like Vincent’s 
(regardless of the period of time being travelled) avoid this problem. This is because fact 
(2) clearly states that the time traveller and his time machine did arrive at the point in time 
to which they are travelling. For this reason, any instantaneous backwards time travel 
which appears in the same coherent fashion as Vincent’s will be ideally conceivable and, 
therefore, logically possible. 
  
 
4. Conceiving of Gradual Backwards Time Travel Journeys 
 
We can conceive ideally of most instantaneous backwards time travel journeys, but 
can the same be said of gradual backwards time travel journeys? This kind of time travel 
will occur whenever a time traveller finds him or herself transported to some point in time 
earlier than his or her time of departure, but takes some amount of time get there. Vincent’s 
story can be altered once again to make it a story of gradual backwards time travel (facts 
altered from VS6 appear in bold):  
 
VS7: Vincent has built a time machine. Vincent steps into his time machine at 12.00pm on 
Friday January 1
st
 2010. He sets the ‘Destination’ time on the machine’s control panel to 
“6.00am Wednesday 1st January 2020” and presses the ‘On’ button. The machine 
disappears. At 6.00am on Wednesday 1
st
 January 2020 Vincent and the time machine 
appear. The physical processes going on within Vincent and the time machine are 
exactly as they would be thirty minutes after Vincent presses the ‘On’ button at 
12.00pm if he does not in fact pressed the button. Vincent and his time machine have 
undergone thirty minutes of normal causal processes since the button was pressed. 
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Vincent exits the time machine (conveniently located in his garage) and goes into his living 
room. Once there, he makes a cup of tea and turns on the television. 
 
 Once again, in order to conceive ideally of this story, we must be capable of 
coherently imagining a possible world in which the following four facts are true: 
 
1. Vincent and his time machine disappear at 12.00pm on Wednesday January 1st 
2020. 
2. Vincent and his time machine appear at 6.00am on Wednesday January 1st 
2020. 
3. Upon appearing, Vincent is able to exit his time machine and physically interact 
with the world around him. 
4. Upon appearing, Vincent and his time machine have undergone thirty minutes 
of normal causal processes since the ‘On’ button was pressed at 12.00pm on 
Wednesday 1
st
 January 2020. 
 
The first three of these facts are identical to those that appear in Vincent’s 
instantaneous forwards time travel story, and we have already established that we are quite 
capable of imagining a possible world in which all of these things occur. We have also 
shown that we can imagine these events occurring in an unusual order (such as an 
appearance preceding a disappearance). The only difference between VS7 and VS6 is the 
fourth fact. Now, Vincent has spent thirty minutes in his time machine since pressing the 
button. Does this affect our ability to imagine coherently a possible world in which 
Vincent carries out such a journey? 
 
It certainly does not seem to prevent Vincent’s story being capable of forming the 
basis of a narrative in which we could become full immersed. Vincent disappears in the 
present and appears in the past, just as he did in VS7. The only difference is that he now 
takes some time to get there. As we discussed when considering gradual forwards time 
travel, the duration of the journey makes no difference to our ability to immerse ourselves 
in the story. 
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Problems only arise when we attempt to apply the second test for coherent modal 
imagination – that is, when we try to fill in extra facts. As with gradual forwards time 
travel journeys, the most important fact in need of filling in is precisely where (and when) 
Vincent and his machine are located during their thirty minute journey. 
 
 
4.1 Journeying Backwards Outside of Time and Space 
 
 Our first response might be to once again state that Vincent and his time machine 
travel outside of time and space. As we discussed in the previous chapter however, all 
events must have some spatial and temporal location. If Vincent experiences thirty minutes 
of events during his journey, then these events must take place at some point in time and 
space. If Vincent and his time machine journey backwards outside of time and space, then 
anything that happens to them during this time happens nowhere and nowhen. This is what 
we referred to as the No-Location Problem. The No-Location Problem is just as applicable 
to cases of backwards time travel as it is to cases of forwards time travel. We can illustrate 
this by re-introducing the wristwatch alarm to the story (facts altered from VS7 appear in 
bold): 
 
VS7*: Vincent steps into his time machine at 12.00pm on Friday January 1
st
 2010 and 
sets the alarm on his wristwatch to go off in 15 minutes time. He sets the ‘Destination’ 
time on the machine’s control panel to “6.00am Friday 1st January 2010” and presses the 
‘On’ button. The machine disappears. At 6.00am that day Vincent and the time machine 
appear. The physical processes going on within Vincent and the time machine are exactly 
as they would be thirty minutes after Vincent presses the ‘On’ button at 12.00pm if he 
does not in fact press the button Vincent and his time machine have undergone thirty 
minutes of normal causal processes since the button was pressed. Vincent’s wristwatch 
alarm sounded 15 minutes into the journey. Vincent exits the time machine 
(conveniently located in his garage) and goes into his living room. Once there, he makes a 
cup of tea and turns on the television. 
 
If Vincent travels outside of time and space, then when and where does his watch 
alarm go off? 
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We simply cannot imagine coherently a world in which events occur outside of 
time and space (recall the orchestra example from earlier)
66
. For this reason, a gradual 
backwards time travel journey outside of time and space is not ideally conceivable. As 
noted previously, this will not necessarily imply the impossibility of such a journey. It will, 
however, thwart any attempt of ours to use the conceivability thesis to make a positive 
argument for the logical possibility of such a journey.  
 
In order to have any chance of ideally conceiving of a gradual backwards time 
travel journey, we must assume that the time traveller and his time machine journey 
through time and space. 
 
 
4.2 Journeying Backwards Through Time and Space 
 
No explicit modifications are needed in order to change the previous story to one in 
which Vincent and his time machine remain physically present throughout their journey. In 
the case of forwards time travel, it was necessary to omit the detail that the machine 
disappeared in order to change the story from one in which the time traveller travelled 
outside of time and space to one where he travelled through time and space. Here this is 
not required, as the machine still disappears. Whether or not Vincent’s backwards time 
travel journey occurs outside of time and space or through time and space, the fact remains 
that immediately after 12.00pm Vincent has already departed and is heading in the 
opposite temporal direction. Vincent’s trajectory through time can be illustrated by the 
dotted line below: 
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Put simply, Vincent and his machine have done a temporal ‘u-turn’, much in the 
same way that a car might turn back down a road it has just travelled. 
 
How does this story fare for conceivability? Having Vincent travel backwards 
through time and space now allows us to fill in extra facts regarding where and when his 
experiences during the journey occur. As with gradual forwards time travel through time 
and space, whatever happens to Vincent during his journey happens at the very same 
location where his time machine was when it began moving backwards through time. As 
for when these events occur, assuming (as we did with forwards time travel) that he travels 
backwards at a constant rate, we can begin to identify when specific events occur. If his 
alarm goes off halfway through Vincent’s journey, then it stands to reason that this will 
occur halfway through the distance he is attempting to travel – that is, at 9.00am. 
 
Unlike a case of gradual forwards time travel through time and space there is no 
argument as to whether or not we are still conceiving of a genuine case of time travel. 
Since Vincent is travelling backwards in time, the period of time traversed (p) is -6 hours, 
whilst the duration of his journey (d) is 0.5 hours. So long as one of these values is 
negative and the other is positive there will clearly be a time discrepancy, and thus a case 
of genuine time travel. 
 
 
4.3 Gradual Backwards Time Travel and the Double Occupancy Problem 
 
By using the approach above, we can fill in facts regarding when and where 
Vincent is located throughout his gradual backwards time travel journey. This is a 
necessary requirement of our being able to imagine coherently a possible world in which 
VS7 occurs. In filling in these facts, however, it seems that a contradiction may very well 
be revealing itself. In ‘Troubles with Time Travel’,67 William Grey raises the following 
issue with cases of gradual backwards time travel through time and space:
68
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How can the ‘movement’ into the past possibly get started? We know that at times later than 
noon there is no machine present, since it has disappeared into the past. But what of the 
moments just before noon? At those times there seem to be not one but two machines – one 
going backwards and the other forwards – each apparently occupying (or attempting to 
occupy) the same location! That is, it seems that as the machine sets out into the past it will 
collide with itself. 
 
This is what Grey refers to as the ‘Double Occupancy Problem’. 
 
This problem clearly applies to VS7. Suppose we label the spatial location of 
Vincent leading up to the time travel journey as L0. Vincent stays at L0 until he hits the 
‘On’ button at precisely 12.00pm, at which point Vincent continues to be located at L0, but 
begins to travel backwards in time. If this is a true description of events, then at 
11.59.59am Vincent is located at L0 travelling forwards through time. Once Vincent 
presses the button, he again finds himself at L0 at 11.59.59am – though this time he is 
travelling backwards through time. There are now two Vincents occupying the same 
spatio-temporal location: one who is just about to press the ‘On’ button and whose watch 
reads 11.59.59am, and another who has just pressed the ‘On’ button and whose watch 
reads some time after 12.00pm. 
 
The above diagram of Vincent’s ‘u-turn’ is therefore not entirely accurate. 
Vincent’s line through time does not neatly turn around in this way. Instead, it turns back 
on itself, attempting to cover the same ground that it has already traversed. His journey is 
not so much analogous to a car turning back down a road as a train on tracks attempting to 
reverse direction back on to itself. 
 
Indeed, the Double Occupancy Problem will also create problems for 
conceivability at the other end of the journey. When Vincent arrives at 6.00am, he and his 
machine will begin to move forward through time in the very same location where they are 
also moving backwards. It is clear that we cannot imagine (let alone imagine coherently) 
Vincent travelling backwards through time in this way. 
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4.4 Dowe’s Solution to the Double Occupancy Problem 
 
How then, might we modify Vincent’s story in such a way as to be able to imagine 
coherently a case of gradual backwards time travel? Clearly, Vincent cannot inhabit the 
same spatio-temporal location more than once. Since gradual backwards time travel 
requires Vincent to travel back through his prior temporal locations, Vincent must avoid 
the double occupancy problem by changing his spatial location. 
 
In ‘The Case for Time Travel’ 69  Phil Dowe attempts to tackle the Double 
Occupancy Problem by using Feynman’s “notorious” interpretation of particle pair 
creation/annihilation. According to Dowe, this interpretation argues that where:
70
 
 
An electron and its antiparticle the positron collide, and disappear leaving just a certain 
amount of energy, we take the positron to be the same electron travelling back in time. The 
annihilation and creation events are interpreted to be reversals in time of the particle. 
 
Dowe believes that such an interpretation provides us with a way in which we can 
imagine gradual backwards time travel through time and space without contradiction:
71
 
 
How does a particle turn around in time without getting in its own way? Answer: same way 
that two particles collide, i.e., by being in motion. How does a police box turn around in 
time without getting in its own way? Answer, by being in motion when it turns around. To 
do this sort of time travel you have to take a run up. So, for a time machine to travel back in 
time on the method envisaged by Grey, it could be moving across a field, and we should 
also see its reversed later self moving toward it... and as the switch is hit the two collide, 
apparently annihilating both. Thus the time machine avoids colliding with itself. 
 
We can use Dowe’s solution in our attempt to conceive of VS7. Suppose we alter 
the facts of this story so that Vincent and his time machine are travelling at some speed in 
the moments leading up to 12.00pm. In this way, Vincent will be located at L-2 at 
11.59.58am, L-1 at 11.59.59am, and finally L0 as he presses the button at 12.00pm. Vincent 
will then begin to move backwards through time, but as he does so he also continues to 
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move in space – occupying L1, then L2, and so on. Thus, while Vincent is moving 
backwards through the temporal locations he has already occupied, he is now at a different 
spatial location, thus avoiding the Double Occupancy Problem. 
 
But does this solution actually work? It allows us to fill in facts regarding where 
and when Vincent is located throughout his journey, but it does not entirely avoid the 
Double Occupancy Problem. As we fill in even more facts, we begin to see that the 
problem remains. 
 
Dowe’s solution would work if it was true that objects moved through space in a 
discrete fashion – that is, if objects were wholly located at one spatial location in one 
instant, and then wholly located at another spatial location in the very next instant. This is 
not the case however, even for very fast moving objects. From one instant to the next 
objects will occupy a region of space that partially overlaps with the region of space they 
occupied in the previous instant. Objects do not move from occupying point L1, to 
occupying point L2, to occupying point L3. Instead they occupy a set of points – points 
which overlap from one instant to the next. An object then, would move from occupying 
points L0.5, L1, L1.5, to occupying points L1.5, L2, L2.5, to occupying points L2.5, L3.0, L3.5. 
 
Put simply, in order for Dowe’s solution to work, the time machine must occupy a 
completely different spatial location in the instant just before, and the instant just after, the 
‘On’ button is pressed. This is not the case however, as no matter how fast a time machine 
travels, it will nevertheless occupy some of the same spatial points both before and after 
the ‘On’ button is pressed. For this reason, the Double Occupancy Problem remains. 
 
It seems then, that if we are to avoid the Double Occupancy Problem by having the 
time machine move, then this move must be a discreet – and instantaneous – one. The time 
machine must be in one spatial location immediately before the ‘On’ button is pressed, and 
a completely different spatial location immediately after it is pressed. Essentially, the time 
machine must teletransport. Allowing a time machine to teletransport as it begins its 
journey backwards in time avoids the Double Occupancy Problem, as there is no risk of the 
two time machines (one travelling forwards and the other travelling backwards) occupying 
the same space at the same time. 
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Dowe considers this solution, but rejects it as it involves a ‘major discontinuity’. 
This may be a particular problem for some metaphysical theories, but here we are solely 
concerned with conceivability. We have already established that we have no problem in 
conceiving of discontinuities of persons and objects, so it may very well be the case that 
incorporating a small spatial teletransportation at the very same instant that the backwards 
time travel journey commences is the best way to ensure the ideal conceivability of gradual 
backwards time travel through time and space 
 
 
4.5 An Alternative Solution to the Double Occupancy Problem 
 
Consider another possible solution. Imagine that the time machine works in the 
same way as those seen in the film Primer. That is, while the contents of the machine are 
transported backwards through time, the machine itself is not. The time machine then, 
merely demarcates a region of space in which causal processes run in reverse. Imagine 
further that as Vincent prepares to make his journey, the machine is already on and 
running. 
 
How does this help the conceivability of gradual backwards time travel? The 
Temporal Collision Problem arises from the fact that two objects (or, rather, two temporal 
stages of the same object) are attempting to inhabit the same spatio-temporal location – one 
moving forwards through time, the other moving backwards. What is problematic, then, is 
that gradual backwards time travel allows an object to travel both forwards and backwards 
in time through the same spatial point. This cannot occur if our time machine operates á la 
Primer. For all spatial points outside of the machine, causation runs in the ordinary 
(forwards) direction, while for all spatial points inside the machine, causation runs in 
reverse. There is no spatial point where causation can run both forwards and backwards. 
With this sort of time machine, no time traveller (nor any object for that matter) can collide 
with its earlier self. 
 
Can we more easily conceive of a gradual backwards time travel journey through 
time and space in this way? 
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For simplicity’s sake, suppose that the time machine operates in such a way that 
causal processes within it run in reverse at a ratio of 1:1. If you were to enter the time 
machine, wait two hours, and then exit, you would find yourself emerging at a point in 
time two hours earlier than the time at which you entered the machine. Imagine then that 
Vincent plans to use this machine to travel back in time from 12.00pm to 6.00am. When 
Vincent’s wristwatch reads 11.55am, he approaches the machine and looks through the 
open doorway. Inside he sees himself waving and wearing a wristwatch that displays the 
time 12.05pm. As he watches, he notices that his counterpart is moving in reverse, and that 
this counterpart’s watch is counting backwards towards 12.00pm. At 11.59pm Vincent 
begins to walk towards the entrance of the time machine. At the same time, his counterpart 
(whose watch now reads 12.01pm) begins to ‘back’ towards the same opening. The two 
Vincents reach the entrance just as their watches both read 12.00pm. 
 
What happens next? 
 
The two Vincents merge, and then an instant later split again. Vincent continues to 
step into the time machine and begins to move backwards through time. He is now the 
counterpart that he has been observing up until this point. Indeed, if he were to look over 
his shoulder as he walked into the machine he would see his immediately prior self 
‘backing away’ from the entrance, the watch of this counterpart counting back the minutes 
from 12.00pm. When 12.05pm arrives, Vincent waves to the counterpart standing outside 
of the machine – a counterpart whose watch now reads 11.55am. 
 
Similar events occur at the other end of the journey. As Vincent’s watch nears 
6.00pm, so too does his arrival at 6.00am. When his watch reaches 5.59pm he looks out of 
the doorway to see a counterpart ‘backing’ towards the doorway. The watch of this 
counterpart reads 6.01pm. As 6.00am nears, the two Vincents approach the doorway and as 
both of their watches read 6.00pm the two merge and split once again. Vincent walks away 
from the machine and – if he is to look over his shoulder – sees his counterpart ‘backing’ 
away from the doorway and into the machine – his watch ticking back the minutes from 
6.00pm. 
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How would an external observer perceive this case of time travel? At 12.00pm they 
would witness the two Vincents (one approaching the door of the time machine from 
outside, the other ‘backing’ towards the doorway from inside the machine) merge. 
Immediately after this merging both Vincents would disappear, as 12.00pm is the point at 
which Vincent reverses his passage through time, meaning he is no longer present after this 
point in time. 
 
If the external observer were around that morning they would be greeted with an 
even more unusual sight. At first they would find themselves observing an empty time 
machine. Then, at 6.00am, Vincent would appear on the threshold of the machine and 
separate into two individuals, one exiting the machine and carrying on as normal (having 
travelled six hours backwards through time), the other backing into the machine and 
remaining there (moving in reverse) for the next six hours. 
 
 As unusual as this story may be, it seems that we can (quite vividly) conceive of a 
possible world in which it takes place. Best of all, we seem perfectly capable of filling in 
all of the facts regarding Vincent’s gradual backwards time travel journey through time 
and space. Such a story is therefore ideally conceivable. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
We are capable of ideally conceiving of some backwards time travel journeys. 
Assuming the truth of the conceivability thesis, this means that some backwards time travel 
journeys are logically possible. While there may be many inconceivable (and, indeed, 
impossible) things that a time traveller is capable of doing upon arriving in the past, this 
does not mean that the time traveller is incapable of getting there in the first place. All 
instantaneous backwards time travel journey are ideally conceivable, so long as the time 
travel journey has as its destination a time and place that the time machine actually 
appeared. The conceivability of gradual backwards time travel is more limited. We cannot 
conceive of a time machine travelling backwards outside of time and space, so the machine 
must remain physically present at all times during its journey. In order to avoid the Double 
59 
 
Occupancy Problem, however, we must imagine the machine working in a specific sort of 
way in order to ensure we can conceive ideally of such a journey.  
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Chapter 4 - Presentism and the Conceivability of Time 
Travel 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In Chapter 1 of this thesis I put forward an argument for the conceivability of time 
travel. In Chapters 2 and 3 I expanded this argument to show that a number of different 
types of time travel are conceivable – including cases of both forwards and backwards time 
travel. If we assume the truth of the conceivability thesis, then the conceivability of these 
journeys entails their logical possibility. 
 
In the process of conceiving of time travel, we also conceive of a number of other 
things: things that some metaphysical theories may hold to be impossibilities. Since 
conceivability entails possibility, it is better for our metaphysical theories to be informed 
by what is conceivable than vice-versa. In this way, I agree with Theodore Sider’s 
argument that “the possibility of time travel limits the space of acceptable theories in 
[metaphysics and philosophy of science concerning the direction of time, causation and so 
on].”72 In the following two chapters I will discuss the implications of the conceivability of 
time travel for specific theories of time and causation. 
 
 
2. How the Conceivability Thesis Informs Our Metaphysical Views 
 
Suppose that we can conceive ideally of a particular case of time travel C. If the 
conceivability thesis is true (as we have assumed), then the following argument can be 
made: 
 
1. If something is conceivable, then that thing is logically possible. 
2. C is conceivable. 
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Therefore, 
3. C is logically possible. 
 
Suppose, however, that some particular metaphysical theory X is inconsistent with 
some state of affairs S. Suppose, further, that S is entailed by C. If this is the case, then a 
proponent of X might make the following argument: 
 
1. X is true. 
2. If X is true, then S is logically impossible 
Therefore, 
3. S is logically impossible. 
4. If C is logically possible, then S is logically possible. 
Therefore, 
5. C is logically impossible 
 
This conclusion is at odds with the conclusion of the conceivability argument 
above. I have argued, however, that what is conceivable should inform what we hold to be 
possible. Thus, in the tradition of one man’s modus ponens being another man’s modus 
tollens, the above argument can be inverted as follows: 
 
1. C is logically possible. 
2. If C is logically possible, then S is logically possible. 
Therefore, 
3. S is logically possible. 
4. If X is true, then S is logically impossible. 
Therefore, 
5. X is false. 
 
As noted above, the conceivability argument provides evidence for the first 
premise. The argument in full, then, appears as follows: 
 
1. If something is conceivable, then that thing is logically possible. 
2. C is conceivable. 
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Therefore, 
3. C is logically possible. 
4. If C is logically possible, then S is logically possible. 
Therefore, 
5. S is logically possible. 
6. If X is true, then S is logically impossible. 
Therefore, 
7. X is false. 
 
 It may be of use to present a concrete analogy for how this argument works. 
Consider a parallel case: Imagine that ‘four-wheelism’ is the view that cars essentially 
possess four wheels – no more, no less. Suppose further that we wanted to disprove four-
wheelism. In order to do this, we do not need to empirically discover a car with a different 
number of wheels, but merely rely on the conceivability of such a vehicle to disprove the 
notion that all cars must have four-wheels. Such an argument would appear as follows: 
 
1. If something is conceivable, then that thing is also logically possible. 
2. A five-wheeled car is conceivable. 
Therefore, 
3. A five-wheeled car is logically possible. 
4. If a five-wheeled car is logically possible, then non-four-wheeled cars are 
logically possible. 
Therefore, 
5. Non-four-wheeled cars are logically possible. 
6. If four-wheelism is true, then non-four-wheeled cars are logically impossible. 
Therefore, 
7. Four-wheelism is false. 
 
 This analogy should highlight how the conceivability thesis is similar to most other 
cases of counter-examples to particular philosophical arguments. Philosophers develop all 
sorts of general accounts, and these accounts have to be capable of handling all possible 
cases. Just like other cases of counter-examples then, the subject described (in this case, a 
five-wheeled car) does not need to actually exist – it merely needs to be conceivable. 
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 So too is it with metaphysical theories. If time travel is conceivable in the same 
way that five-wheeled cars are, then our metaphysical views must be capable of 
accommodating such journeys. If not, they must be abandoned. 
  
 
3. Presentism and Time Travel 
 
According to presentism only the present exists.
73
 The usual interpretation of 
presentism takes this to imply that travelling to other times is impossible.
74
 This is 
problematic. In the preceding chapters I have made out a clear case for the conceivability 
of at least some time travel journeys. The conceivability of any time travel journey – be it 
instantaneous or gradual, forwards or backwards – necessarily entails the conceivability of 
travel to the past or future. This is, by definition, exactly what time travel is. We cannot 
conceive of Vincent undergoing a forwards time travel journey without conceiving of him 
travelling to the future. Likewise, we cannot conceive of Vincent undergoing a backwards 
time travel journey without him travelling to the past. If some cases of time travel are 
conceivable (and therefore possible) so too is travel to other times. So long as one of these 
stories is conceivable, we will have proven the logical possibility of travel to other times. 
 
 In this chapter I will argue that the conceivability of time travel means the 
presentist must either modify their view of time to accommodate the possibility of time 
travel journeys or abandon presentism altogether. 
 
 
4. The Nowhere Argument 
 
Presentism is the view that:
75
 
 
all reality is confined to the present – that past and future things simply do not exist, and 
that all quantified statements that seem to carry commitment to past or future things are 
either false or susceptible of paraphrase into statements that avoid the implication. 
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Ordinarily, presentists have a hard time making sense of time travel stories. Indeed, 
as Simon Keller and Michael Nelson note, the ‘common view’ is that “time travel is 
possible if the four-dimensional view of time is correct, but is not possible if presentism is 
true”.76 
 
The presentist’s difficulty arises from the supposed destinations of potential time 
travellers. Vincent, currently at 12.00pm, plans to travel forward to 6.00pm or backward to 
6.00am – but according to the presentist these destinations simply do not exist. So far as 
the presentist is concerned, 6.00pm is just like Tatooine.
77
 Neither is real, and we are just 
as incapable of travelling to one as we are the other. Put simply, “one cannot journey to the 
nonexistent, and so if presentism is true, then one cannot travel to nonexistent points in 
time, namely any time other than the present”.78 This is what Keller and Nelson call the 
Nowhere Argument against time travel. For our purposes it is better to state the argument 
more formally. The Nowhere Argument, then, appears as follows:
79
 
 
1. Presentism is true. 
2. If presentism is true, then only the present exists. 
Therefore, 
3. Only the present exists. 
4. It is logically impossible to travel to a time that does not exist. 
Therefore, 
5. Travelling to the past or future is logically impossible. 
6. If time travel is logically possible, then so too is travelling to the past or future. 
Therefore, 
7. Time travel is logically impossible. 
 
What, precisely, does this argument mean for our ability to conceive of (at least 
some) time travel journeys? 
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5. The Conceivability of Time Travel and the Somewhere Argument 
 
According to the Nowhere Argument, the truth of presentism means that time travel 
is impossible. Despite this, however, it is clear that we can conceive of travel to other 
times. Since we cannot conceive of something that is logically impossible,
80
 the Nowhere 
Argument must be flawed in some way. 
 
Suppose that, as we did with the argument for four-wheelism, we use the possibility 
of time travel to turn the Nowhere Argument back on itself: 
 
1. Time travel is logically possible. 
2. If time travel is logically possible, then so too is travelling to the past or future. 
Therefore, 
3. Travelling to the past or future is logically possible. 
4. It is logically impossible to travel to a time that does not exist. 
Therefore, 
5. The past and future exist. 
6. If presentism is true, then only the present exists. 
Therefore, 
7. Presentism is false. 
 
To be clear, the truth of the first premise is derived from the truth of the 
conceivability thesis combined with our assertion that at least one time travel journey is 
conceivable. The full argument, then, is as follows: 
 
1. If something is conceivable, then that thing is also logically possible. 
2. Time travel is conceivable. 
Therefore 
3. Time travel is logically possible. 
4. If time travel is logically possible, then so too is travelling to the past or future. 
Therefore, 
5. Travelling to the past or future is logically possible. 
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6. It is logically impossible to travel to a time that does not exist. 
Therefore, 
7. The past and future exist. 
8. If presentism is true, then only the present exists. 
Therefore, 
9. Presentism is false. 
 
I will henceforth refer to this as the Somewhere Argument. The argument is valid. 
Premise (1) will be true if we accept the truth of the conceivability thesis. Premise (2) will 
be true if we acknowledge that at least one time travel story is conceivable. Premise (3) is 
entailed by premises (1) and (2). Premise (4) is a fairly uncontroversial statement about 
what time travel entails. Premise (5) is entailed by (3) and (4). Premise (6), as we shall see, 
is the contentious claim. Premise (7) is entailed by (5) and (6). Premise (8) is merely a 
statement of presentism in its simplest form. 
 
What reply might the presentist give to such an argument? 
 
 
6. Possible Presentist Replies to the Somewhere Argument 
 
The presentist’s first objection might be to simply disagree with premise (1) and 
state that the conceivability thesis is false. As noted earlier, the conceivability thesis is the 
thesis that if something is conceivable, then it is also logically possible. The presentist may 
reject this claim, instead arguing that we can conceive of things that are logically 
impossible, and that the conceivability of something in no way entails its logical 
possibility. I will not provide a reply to that objection here. For the purposes of this thesis I 
have assumed the truth of the conceivability thesis. I gave some reasons for this 
assumption in Chapter 1
81
 and, in the absence of any counter-examples (that is, cases of 
logical impossibility which we are capable of conceiving of) it seems safe to assume that 
this thesis holds. 
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Alternatively, the presentist might object to premise (2) by arguing that we are not 
actually conceiving of those time travel stories we discussed in Chapters 1, 2 and 3. This is 
a bold claim. Granted, some cases of time travel are more difficult to conceive of than 
others (gradual backwards time travel, for example). Despite this, we can – and did – 
conceive of at least some simple time travel journeys. It does not need to be the case that 
all time travel journeys are conceivable, nor that even all time travel journeys discussed in 
this thesis are conceivable. All the Somewhere Argument needs is one conceivable time 
travel journey, and it seems clear that we at least have this. 
 
The best option for the presentist is to deny premise (6): that is, to deny that it is 
impossible to travel to a time that does not exist. This allows the presentist to maintain 
their core belief (that only the present exists) while allowing for the conceivability of time 
travel journeys. This, in a sense, is exactly what we should expect. If time travel is 
possible, then presentism must be compatible with such journeys in order to remain a 
plausible theory of time. 
 
 
7. Should Presentists Believe in Time travel? 
 
Simon Keller and Michael Nelson put forward
 
an explanation of how presentists 
can make sense of stories containing travel to other (non-existent) times.
82
  It is not my 
intention to repeat that argument in its entirety. Instead, I will briefly explain how the 
presentist can use Keller and Nelson’s approach to reject premise (6) of the Somewhere 
Argument and shore up their own theory of time in the face of conceivable time travel 
journeys. 
 
In order to make their argument, Keller and Nelson focus on stories that are clearly 
cases of time travel and that seem to be compatible with a four-dimensional view of time. 
They then attempt to show that “if these stories really are compatible with four-
dimensionalism, and presentism is at all plausible, then they are compatible with 
presentism too”.83 To be clear, Keller and Nelson do not argue that all cases of time travel 
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are possible on a presentist model of time – only some. Hopefully, however, the set of time 
travel stories that are compatible with presentism will include all of those time travel 
stories that are conceivable. If not, it will remain the case that there are some conceivable 
(and therefore possible) time travel stories for which the presentist cannot account, thus 
restoring force to the Somewhere Argument against presentism. 
 
 
7.1 Keller and Nelson’s Criticism of the Nowhere Argument 
 
 Keller and Nelson object to the Nowhere Argument on the ground that it simply 
proves too much. They note that if it were a good argument it would not only rule out time 
travel, but also our ordinary passage through time from one moment to the next:
84
 
 
Consider what is about to happen to all of us. We are about to take a journey into the 
immediate future. Now it is over... We just travelled to a time that did not exist, and we 
are about to travel to a time that does not exist. If it were impossible to travel to times that 
do not exist, then we would not be able to make these journeys in time, and the ordinary 
passage of time from one moment to the next would be impossible.   
 
Where the argument goes wrong, they allege, is in its statement that it is impossible 
to travel to a time that does not exist. The presentist, then, can use Keller and Nelson’s 
argument to disagree with premise (6) of the Somewhere Argument, thus avoiding the 
conclusion that presentism is false. 
 
 
7.2 Travelling to Non-existent Times 
 
Of all of the time travel stories discussed in this thesis, it would seem that the most 
clearly conceivable is Vincent’s first (instantaneous) foray into the future. Consider again 
VS1: 
 
VS1: Vincent has built a time machine. Vincent steps into the machine at 12.00pm on 
Wednesday 1
st
 January 2020. He sets the destination time on the machine’s control panel to 
                                                 
84
 Ibid., p. 335. 
69 
 
“6.00pm Wednesday 1st January 2020” and presses the ‘On’ button. The machine 
disappears. At 6.00pm that same day the machine reappears. The physical going on within 
Vincent and the time machine are now exactly as they would have been immediately after 
Vincent pressed the ‘On’ button at 12.00pm if he had not in fact pressed the button. 
Vincent exits the time machine (conveniently located in his garage) and goes into his living 
room. Once there, he makes a cup of tea and turns on the television to watch the six o’clock 
news. 
 
The conceivability of this story entails its possibility. How, then, can the presentist 
make sense of this journey without compromising their position that only the present 
exists? 
 
As Keller and Nelson note, while presentists believe that the past and future do not 
exist, they usually do not “go so far as to say that there are no past- or future- tensed 
truths.”85 A presentist can, for example, say that it is true that a Democratic candidate won 
the U.S. Presidential Election in 2008, just as they can say that it is true that a U.S. 
Presidential Election will be held in 2012.
86
 Presentists can also make past- and future- 
tensed truths about presently existing entities. They can, for example, say that it is true that 
Barack Obama was elected as President of the United States of America in 2008, just as we 
can say it is true that one day he will no longer be President. 
 
It is the presentist’s ability to make truth claims about the past and future that 
provides the foundation for presentist time travel. It does not matter how the presentist 
accounts for past- and future- tensed truths, it is enough that presentists are capable of 
doing this somehow.
87
 If we assume that presentists can make truth claims about the past 
and future then it is clear that they can describe many of same time travel stories as the 
four-dimensionalist.  As Keller and Nelson note:
88
 
 
The point is that all the details that featured in the four-dimensionalist story can be 
included in the presentist story too, so long as they are expressed as tensed truths properly 
relativised to the present. Four-dimensional time travel is possible because it is possible 
that there are the right sorts of patterns of events. 
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 Four-dimensional time travel simply requires that certain events happen at certain 
times. When conceiving of Vincent’s various journeys we made lists of these events. Lists 
like: 
 
1. Vincent and his time machine disappear at 12.00pm on Wednesday 1st January 
2020. 
2. Vincent and his time machine appear at 6.00pm on Wednesday 1st January 
2020. 
3. Upon appearing, Vincent is able to exit his time machine and physically interact 
with the world around him. 
4. Upon appearing, Vincent’s immediately prior experience is of having pressed 
the ‘On’ button in his time machine at 12.00pm on Wednesday 1st January 
2020. 
  
According to Keller and Nelson, all of these events are just as capable of being 
described on a presentist view of time. VS1 is initially described in four-dimensional 
terms, but there is nothing preventing a translation of this story into presentist terms. 
Consider the following retelling of the story: 
 
VS1(P): It is 12.00pm on Wednesday 1
st
 January 2020. Vincent has built a time machine. 
Vincent is now stepping into the machine. Once he is in the time machine, he will set the 
destination time on the machine’s control panel to “6.00pm Wednesday 1st January 2020” 
and press the ‘On’ button. Immediately after Vincent presses the button, he and the 
machine will disappear. At 6.00pm today the machine will reappear. The physical 
processes going on within Vincent and the time machine will be exactly as they would have 
been immediately after Vincent pressed the ‘On’ button at 12.00pm if he had not in fact 
pressed the button. Vincent will exit the time machine (conveniently located in his garage) 
and go into his living room. Once there, he will make a cup of tea and turn on the television 
to watch the six o’clock news. 
 
If we are slightly more ambitious, we can even attempt a retelling of Vincent’s 
instantaneous backwards time travel story: 
 
VS6(P): It is 12.00pm on Wednesday January 1
st
 2020. Vincent has built a time machine. 
Vincent is now stepping into the machine. Once he is in the time machine, he will set the 
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destination time on the machine’s control panel to “6.00am Wednesday January 1st 2020” 
and press the ‘On’ button. Immediately after Vincent presses the button, he and the 
machine will disappear.  At 6.00am Wednesday January 1
st
 2020 the machine appeared. 
The physical processes going on within Vincent and the time machine were exactly as they 
will be immediately after Vincent presses the ‘On’ button at 12.00pm if he does not in fact 
press the button. Vincent exited the time machine (conveniently located in his garage) and 
went into his living room. Once there, he made a cup of tea and turned on the television. 
 
In this way, we can retell both forwards and backwards instantaneous time travel 
stories in presentist terms. 
 
It is unclear whether our conceivable case of gradual backwards time travel can be 
restated in this way. Perhaps this is one of those stories that Keller and Nelson note as 
particularly problematic for presentists – stories containing closed timelike curves.89 I will 
not discuss this case. It is not my intention to provide a full defence of presentism here, but 
rather to point out one way in which the presentist might respond to the conceivability of 
time travel stories. If presentism a plausible theory of time, then it must be able to make 
sense of all of those time travel stories we find to be conceivable. 
 
 
7.3 Presentist Time Travel and Personal Identity 
 
 Presentist time travel relies on our ability to restate the facts of a four-dimensional 
time travel journey in presentist terms. As shown above, it seems clear that we are able to 
do this with Vincent’s instantaneous time travel journeys. There is an underlying 
assumption in Vincent’s stories that we have not yet considered, however: namely, that the 
Vincent who appears at the destination time is the very same Vincent who disappears at the 
departure time. Personal identity is the lynchpin for any credible time travel story. If we 
cannot show that the person appearing in the past or future is the very same person as the 
one who disappears in the present, then we don't really have a time travel story, but rather a 
story of random appearances and disappearances of persons. We must therefore examine 
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whether the facts which make a time traveller the very same person can be translated into 
presentist terms. 
 
What is it that makes the Vincent who disappears the very same Vincent who 
reappears in our four-dimensionalist time travel stories? As Keller and Nelson note, there 
are various views. We might hold that the two Vincents are the same person “because they 
are parts of the same causal chain; ...because they share a soul; ...because they have the 
same brain; ...the same body; [or] because they are psychologically continuous.” 90 
Whatever our particular theory of personal identity may be, we will acknowledge that there 
is some relation (call this the R-relation) that is sufficient for personal identity and that is 
capable of holding between discontinuous person stages. Without this, we cannot have 
even four-dimensional time travel stories. 
 
According to Keller and Nelson any R-relation which holds on a four-dimensional 
time travel story should be just as capable of holding on a presentist time travel story. 
There is no special problem of personal identity for presentist time travel.  Put simply: “if 
the four-dimensionalist can get away with saying that [discontinuous person stages] are all 
the same person, then the presentist can too.”91 Suppose we adopt the following R-relation: 
 
“A is identical to B iff A remembers being B, or B remembers being A.” 
 
The Vincent who appears clearly remembers being the Vincent who disappeared, as 
evidenced by the fact that “upon appearing, Vincent’s immediately prior experience is of 
having pressed the ‘On’ button at 12.00pm on Wednesday 1st January 2020”.92 On the 
above R-relation then, the Vincent who appears is the very same person as the Vincent who 
disappears. The same will remain true regardless of whether the facts of Vincent’s story 
are expressed in four-dimensional or presentist terms. In this way, then, the R-relation 
holds, regardless of what view of time is adopted. 
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7.4 Presentist Time Travel as Suicide 
 
Steven Hales disagrees, believing that “there is still a remaining conundrum for the 
would-be presentist time traveller, one that cannot be resolved through the clever 
manipulation of tensed sentences”.93 Hales argues that, for presentists, an instantaneous 
time travel journey is simply suicide:
94
 
 
Recall that presentists are committed to a purely objective present; the events and objects 
at this objective present alone are real, even if other things have been or will be real. After 
entering the time machine, [the time traveller] no longer exists in the objective present, 
and therefore he is no longer in reality. Which is just to say that [the time traveller] ought 
to view the time machine with considerable trepidation – after all, it means his 
annihilation. 
 
On this view, then, when Vincent presses the ‘On’ button in his time machine, he 
causes himself to cease to exist in the objective present. That is, he causes himself to cease 
to exist at all. 
 
According to Hales, permanent time travel to the past means death for Vincent.
95
 
This is a concept explored in the Doctor Who episode ‘Blink’,96 where fictional antagonists 
known as the Weeping Angels kill their victims “in the nicest way possible” – namely by 
sending them far back in time to live out the rest of their lives. Consider also what happens 
at the other end of the time travel journey:
97
 
 
Not only does presentist “time travel” merely require the would-be traveller to go out of 
existence in nihilum, but it also requires that objects come into existence ex nihilo. When 
[the time traveller] steps into the time machine in 2010 and pushes the buttons for 399 
BCE, the time machine causes it to be the case that in 399 BCE, [the time traveller] came 
into existence. But he literally came into existence out of nothing. 
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So, Hales argues, a presentist account of time travel not only results in the death of 
a time traveller, but also leads to strange appearances out of nowhere. 
 
Even more unusual is what happens when Vincent travels forward in time. If he 
travels six hours into the future then he will go out of existence at 12.00pm, and come back 
into existence six hours later. In cases like this, time travel into the future is best described 
as “death and resurrection of the body”.98 
 
I do not see how either of these cases is particularly problematic for presentist time 
travel. While they do present some unusual results of time travel stories told on presentist 
terms, they do not in any way demonstrate the impossibility of such journeys. 
 
The notion that backwards time travel is equivalent to ‘death’ on a presentist view 
of time is simply mistaken. In order to see this, it is important to refer to Lewis’ concepts 
of personal and external time.
99
  Personal time is that measured from the perspective of the 
time traveller (say by his exceptionally reliable wristwatch), while external time is that 
measured by the ‘rest-of-the-world’ (say by the Greenwich Mean Time Clock). 100  A 
person, then, is a collection of consecutive person stages. These stages should be ordered 
according to the personal time of the individual, though the stages may in fact be located at 
very distant or unordered points in external time. Death is what occurs to the very last 
person-stage identified by any particular R-relation – that is, the person stage which is 
followed by no further person stages. If there is, was, or will be some person stage which 
exists – in personal time – after Vincent’s current person stage, then Vincent will not die 
when he presses the ‘On’ button. Suppose we adopt the R-relation from before: that is, the 
R-relation which states that “A is identical to B iff A remembers being B, or B remembers 
being A.” If there is some person stage which will remember being Vincent at 12.00pm 
then, on this account of personal identity, Vincent will not die at 12.00pm. It does not 
particularly matter when (or where) that next person stage is located. 
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All Hales has done is to exaggerate a number of general anxieties we have 
regarding discontinuous person stages. Any misgivings we had about pressing the ‘On’ 
button of an instantaneous time travel machine would arise from the temporal discontinuity 
that was about to occur in our person, regardless of whether we did this on a four-
dimensional or presentist view of time. If we are wary of discontinuities in our personhood, 
then we should be just as wary of four-dimensional instantaneous time travel as we are 
presentist instantaneous time travel. We should also feel equally uncomfortable about any 
other potentially discontinuity-causing technologies such as teletransportation. Presentist 
time travel, then, is not ‘suicide’ – at least, no more so than any other discontinuity-causing 
journey is. 
 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
If presentism is to remain a plausible theory of time, then it must have a way of 
accommodating those time travel stories which are conceivable, and thus possible. The 
best way for the presentist to do this is to restate conceivable time travel stories in 
presentist terms. By doing this, the presentist maintains their belief that only the present 
exists, while also allowing for the possibility of some time travel stories. 
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Chapter 5: Causation and the Conceivability of Time 
Travel 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Our ability to conceive of a number of different cases of time travel entails the 
conceivability of two particularly unusual types of causal relationship. In this chapter I will 
describe these types of causal relationships, and the implications of their conceivability for 
which views of causation we choose to adopt. 
 
 
2. Causation at a Distance 
 
When we conceive of cases of instantaneous time travel (be it forwards or 
backwards) we also conceive of causation at a distance – that is, some cause C bringing 
about some effect E at an earlier
101
 or later time, even though C and E are at a temporal 
distance. Why is this unusual? It certainly seems that we already experience causation at 
distance on a regular basis. Every night before bed I set my alarm clock to go off the 
following morning, and this cause (setting the alarm) leads to an effect (my alarm going 
off) many hours later. Is this not causation at a distance? While it may appear that this 
cause and effect are located at a temporal distance, they are in fact linked by a “chain of 
causal dependence that links the two events across time”.102 In setting the alarm, I initiate a 
causal chain of digital programming which will eventually result in the sounding of my 
alarm the following morning. This causal chain closes the apparent causal distance 
between cause and effect. 
 
The same cannot be said of instantaneous time travel. In order to conceive ideally 
of Vincent’s instantaneous forwards time travel journey, we had to imagine a world in 
which four facts held: 
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1. Vincent and his time machine disappear at 12.00pm on Wednesday 1st January 
2020. 
2. Vincent and his time machine appear at 6.00pm on Monday 1st January 2120. 
3. Upon appearing, Vincent is able to exit his time machine and physically interact 
with the world around him. 
4. Upon appearing, Vincent’s immediately prior experience is of having pressed 
the ‘On’ button at 12.00pm on Wednesday 1st January 2020. 
   
It is true that there is nothing in these facts that states that Vincent’s appearance 
was caused by his disappearance, nor that his memories at 6.00pm were caused by the 
events prior to his disappearance at 12.00pm. Causation, however, is implicit. In order for 
this to be a genuine case of time travel, the Vincent who appears at 6.00pm must be the 
very same Vincent who disappears at 12.00pm. If this is the case, then the memories that 
Vincent possesses at 6.00pm must have been caused by the events that occurred prior to 
12.00pm. 
 
Unlike the case of my alarm clock, however, a case of instantaneous time travel 
involves the time machine and time traveller being located nowhere and nowhen during 
their journey. When Vincent’s time machine travels from 12.00pm to 6.00pm it skips over 
the six hours in between. There is no chain of causal dependence linking its disappearance 
to its reappearance as there was linking the setting of my alarm at night to its going off in 
the morning. A case of instantaneous time travel is thus a much clearer example of 
causation at a distance. C (the disappearance of the time machine) causes E (the 
appearance of the time machine) despite the two events being at a temporal distance and 
having no linking chain of causal dependence to bridge this gap. 
 
The conceivability of instantaneous time travel entails the logical possibility of 
causation at a distance. Any plausible view of causation must, therefore, be able to account 
for such cases of causation. There is, however, a far more troubling implication of the 
conceivability of time travel for our views of causation. 
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3. Backwards Causation 
 
 Our ability to conceive of time travel necessarily involves an ability to conceive of 
causation moving in whatever direction the time traveller is travelling. This is not a 
problem in the case of forwards time travel, as causation continues to run in the normal 
direction: that is, causes precede effects and effects follow causes. Cases of backwards 
time travel are more problematic. In these cases, effects can precede causes and causes 
follow effects. 
 
In order to conceive ideally of Vincent’s instantaneous backwards time travel 
journey, we had to be capable of coherently imagining a world in which four facts held: 
 
1. Vincent and his time machine disappear at 12.00pm on Wednesday 1st January 
2020. 
2. Vincent and his time machine appear at 6.00am Wednesday 1st January 2020 
3. Upon appearing, Vincent is able to exit his machine and physically interact with 
the world around him. 
4. Upon appearing, Vincent’s immediately prior experience is of having pressed 
the ‘On’ button in his time machine at 12.00pm on Wednesday 1st January 
2020. 
 
In this case, Vincent carries out backwards causation by merely arriving in the past 
– that is, by having his disappearance in the future as the cause of his appearance in the 
past. It is true that nowhere in these facts is it made explicit that Vincent’s disappearance at 
12.00pm causes his appearance at 6.00am. However, as stated above, this causation should 
be implicit. If Vincent’s disappearance at 12.00pm did not cause his appearance at 6.00am 
then we are not, in fact, dealing with a time travel story at all. 
 
For the purposes of this argument, however, I will focus on cases of gradual 
backwards time travel, as in these cases backwards causation is far more apparent. 
Consider the version of Vincent’s story which described the time machine as a room in 
which time ran backwards at a ratio of 1:1. Suppose that, just before departing, Vincent 
was overcome with a tremendous appetite, so pocketed an apple for a snack on his 
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impending journey. Once he has entered the machine (and begun his journey back in time) 
he begins to eat the apple. On this story, the following would be true: 
 
1. Vincent’s hunger at 12.00pm is a cause of Vincent having an apple in his 
pocket at 11.55am. 
2. Vincent having an apple in his pocket at 11.55am is a cause of Vincent eating 
an apple at 11.30am. 
3. Vincent eating an apple at 11.30am is a cause of Vincent having an apple core 
in his pocket at 11.00am. 
 
We stated above that backwards causation will have occurred where the time 
machine and time traveller simply appear in the past. It is clear, however, that in cases of 
gradual backwards time travel the time traveller does not even have to get this far. As soon 
as the time traveller begins to move backwards in time there is backwards causation. 
 
It is clear then that our ability to conceive of gradual backwards time travel also 
entails an ability to conceive of backwards causation. What does the conceivability of 
backwards causation mean for our ordinary views of causation? Before answering this 
question, it may be useful first to outline a common view of the direction of causation. 
 
 
4. Mellor’s View of Causation 
 
As D.H. Mellor notes, the most striking difference between the past and the future 
is that “we can see... what is past, but cannot affect it”, whereas with the future “we can 
affect it, but not see it”.103 This distinction is a result of the direction of causation. Causes 
precede effects, and effects follow causes. My experiences of an event are an effect, the 
cause of which is the event itself. For this reason I cannot see what lies in the future. 
Likewise, my actions are causes, the effects of which will occur later. For this reason I 
cannot affect what is past. 
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In our ordinary experiences causation continually runs in a forward direction. It 
seems, however, that the tendency of causation to always run in the same direction is far 
more than a coincidence. Indeed, the direction of causation does not seem contingent, but 
rather “absolute and unchanging”.104 What, then, explains this? 
 
There is clearly a link between causal order and temporal order, with causes 
occurring earlier than their effects, and effects occurring later than their causes. Mellor 
argues that it cannot be the case that the causal order and the temporal order are completely 
independent as, if this were so, it would be “as conceivable that effects generally precede 
their causes as that causes generally precede their effect”.105 Perhaps then, causal order 
simply matches up with temporal order, and we may define a cause “as the earlier of two 
causally related facts or events”.106 According to Mellor, however, this simply will not do. 
This is due to the fact that:
107
 
 
There are at least two other ways of distinguishing causes from effects with which this 
definition could conflict. These follow from the fact that whereas causes both explain their 
effects and provide means of bringing them about, effects neither explain nor provide means 
of bringing about their causes. 
 
Vincent’s hunger and possession of a delicious apple explain and provide a means 
of bringing about the fact that he has an apple core in his pocket. The opposite is not true. 
The fact that Vincent has an apple core in his pocket does not explain or provide a means 
of bringing about the fact that he is hungry and possesses a delicious apple. 
 
While it is useful to use the notions of explanation and means to pick out the cause 
in any pair of causally related facts, it does not explain why this definition continually 
picks out the earlier fact of any given pair. Put simply, it does not explain the continually 
observed relationship between causes and effects, and earlier and later times. The fact that 
“we cannot reduce the causal order of facts and events to their temporal order”108 leads 
Mellor to believe that the reduction should operate in the opposite way. That is, that 
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temporal order relies on causal order. He argues that “if the general coincidence of causal 
and temporal order is to be more than a coincidence, it cannot be because time order fixes 
causal order. It must be the other way around.”109 
 
 
5. Backwards Causation on Mellor’s View of Causation 
 
What then, does our ability to conceive of backwards causation mean for Mellor’s 
view of causation? On first gloss, it seems that there is no problem. Mellor himself even 
acknowledges the “apparent possibility... of backward causation” 110  on a view which 
reduces temporal order to causal order. 
 
Indeed, Mellor’s view of the relationship between time and causation makes our job 
much easier. Many of the problems with backward causation arise from the way in which it 
apparently runs counter to the flow of time: specifically, the way in which it allows causes 
to be later than effects. On Mellor’s view, however, we can begin with our conception of a 
case of backwards causation and then, from this, draw conclusions regarding the direction 
of time in that story. Causes will still precede effects, and effects follow causes. Recall 
Vincent’s gradual backwards time travel journey. We were able to conceive ideally of this 
journey by coherently imagining a possible world in which there existed a machine in 
which all causal processes ran backwards. On Mellor’s view of the relationship between 
time and causation this machine is – by definition – simply a region of space in which time 
runs counter to the direction it runs elsewhere. 
 
There is nothing problematic about this. Our ability to conceive ideally of cases of 
gradual backwards time travel simply shows an ability to conceive of regions of space in 
which the causal order – and therefore the temporal order – runs in a different direction to 
its direction in other regions. Indeed, even referring to this as ‘backwards’ causation is 
somewhat parochial. Who is to say that the direction of time in our particular region of 
space is necessarily ‘forwards’? To the backward-travelling time traveller looking out of 
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his time machine’s window, it would appear that the rest of the world is undergoing 
backwards causation, while he alone is moving forwards. 
 
It might be argued that the very notion of backwards time travel implicitly requires 
some objective direction of time according to which the time traveller can travel 
‘backward’. Such a direction may be established by doing as Lewis does and observing the 
direction in which counterfactual dependence – and thereby causation – tends to run.111 If 
temporal order is defined by causal order (a point that I have not – and do not plan to – 
contest), then this would be a way of establishing in which regions of space time runs in 
the ‘normal’ direction and in which regions time runs counter to this. 
 
I do not, however, believe that we even need to go this far. As we have defined it, 
time travel merely requires some discrepancy between the duration of a time traveller’s 
journey and the period of time he has traversed. This requirement can be met simply by 
transferring from a region of space where time runs in one direction to a region of space in 
which it runs in the opposite direction. If this is done, then a time discrepancy will have 
occurred. No appeal to an objective ‘forwards’ direction of time is required. 
 
It is clear then that, on an account of causation which defines temporal order as 
causal order, backwards causation is entirely possible. 
 
 
6. Mellor’s Objections to Backwards Causation 
 
Despite the apparent compatibility of backwards causation with this theory of 
causation, Mellor objects to its possibility. 
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6.1 Mellor’s First Objection 
 
While there is nothing problematic in having different causal (and therefore 
temporal) directions in different regions of space, a problem does seem to arise when 
something moves from one region to another – just as Vincent does when he exits his 
machine at his temporal destination of 6.00am. Throughout the time travel journey, causes 
continue to occur before their effects. This is trivially true, as the temporal ordering of 
‘before’ and ‘after’ is defined by the causal order. There is, for example, nothing 
problematic about the following two facts of Vincent’s journey: 
 
1. Vincent having an apple in his pocket at 11.55am is a cause of Vincent eating 
an apple at 11.30am. 
2. Vincent eating an apple at 11.30am is a cause of Vincent having an apple core 
in his pocket at 11.00am. 
 
While these facts may seem unusual, it is only because we have ascribed times to 
these events based upon the times given in an adjacent region of space where causal 
processes are running counter to those in the machine. The above two causally related facts 
are therefore better described as follows: 
 
1. Vincent having an apple in his pocket five minutes into his journey is a cause 
of Vincent eating an apple thirty minutes into his journey. 
2. Vincent eating an apple thirty minutes into his journey is a cause of Vincent 
having an apple core in his pocket sixty minutes into his journey. 
 
Such a description is unproblematic, as causes continue to precede their effects. 
This is because all causally related events are occurring within a region of space (Region 
A) in which all causal processes run in the same direction. Effects might appear to precede 
causes as viewed from some other region of space, but as noted above, this is mere 
parochialism. Effects precede causes in Region A no more than effects precede causes in 
our region as viewed by those in Region A. Temporal direction relies on causal direction, 
so it makes no sense to order events in Region A according to the causal direction of our 
own region. 
84 
 
Problems arise, however, when something passes from a region of one causal 
direction to a region of a different causal direction. In these cases it becomes true that, on 
Mellor’s view of causation, effects can precede their causes. 
 
Mellor, however, strongly disagrees with the claim that an effect can precede its 
cause. He illustrates this by raising a common objection to backwards time travel: the 
infamous Grandfather Paradox.
112
 This is the paradox that says that, if backwards causation 
is possible (ordinarily in the form of time travel), then it would be possible for an 
individual to take certain actions which would result in the death of his or her grandfather. 
Since doing this would result in a clear contradiction,
113
 backwards causation must be 
logically impossible. 
 
Mellor discusses several unsatisfactory replies to the Grandfather Paradox before 
settling on David Lewis’ consistency requirement as the best solution to the problem. This 
is the requirement that a time traveller simply will not do something which was not in fact 
done (such as causing his own grandfather to be killed before fathering any children).
114
 
The very existence of the time traveller clearly shows that he did, and therefore will, fail in 
any such attempt. The reasons for this could be many: “perhaps some noise distracts him at 
the last moment, perhaps he misses despite all his target practice, perhaps his nerve fails, 
perhaps he even feels a pang of unaccustomed mercy.”115 
 
Mellor disagrees with Lewis’ solution, arguing that there is still a very real sense in 
which a time traveller could do something contradictory.
116
 According to Mellor, the 
response given by Lewis “overlooks the existence of real contingent possibilities”.117 
Mellor rightly notes that there are things the time traveller could do in the past, but which 
(on Lewis’ view) he will not do as “it is necessarily impossible for [the time traveller] to 
do anything that would make his time travel tale inconsistent”.118 According to Mellor 
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however, “nothing can be contingently possible that is necessarily impossible”, and for this 
reason stories containing backwards causation must be logically impossible.
119
 
 
Since backwards time travel necessarily entails this sort of causation, Mellor 
believes that backwards time travel must also be logically impossible. 
 
 
6.2 Responding to Mellor’s First Objection 
 
 As has been argued throughout this thesis, conceivability entails possibility. The 
fact that we can conceive of Vincent’s backwards time travel journey is very good 
evidence for the logical possibility of such a journey. Backwards time travel entails 
backwards causation, suggesting that that this, too, is logically possible. If this is so, then 
Mellor’s argument for the logical impossibility of backwards causation (and, by virtue of 
this, the logical impossibility of backwards time travel) must be flawed in some way. The 
fact that we are quite capable of ideally conceiving of cases of backwards time travel 
should give us good reason to reject Mellor’s argument that all backwards time travel 
journeys are logically impossible. 
 
Mellor’s argument fails for two reasons. Firstly, he falls into the very trap that 
Lewis warns against. Mellor states that the contradiction in the Grandfather Paradox arises 
from the fact that something – namely, killing one’s own grandfather – is both contingently 
possible and logically impossible. As Lewis explains, however, such a contradiction is 
based on an equivocation regarding what a time traveller can do. To say that killing one’s 
grandfather is contingently possible is to say that the time traveller can kill his grandfather 
because he has what it takes. To say that killing one’s grandfather is necessarily 
impossible is to say that the time traveller cannot kill his grandfather because it is logically 
impossible to change the past.
120
 According to Lewis, there is no contradiction in holding 
both of these facts to be true. They are “compatible because ‘can’ is equivocal”. 121 
According to one “fairly rich”122 set of facts – namely, a set of facts regarding how well-
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motivated, well-trained, well-informed, and well-armed the time traveller is – the time 
traveller can clearly kill his or her grandfather. According to another more inclusive set of 
facts, however – namely a set of facts which includes the important fact that the time 
traveller’s grandfather did not die before fathering any children – the time traveller cannot 
kill his or her grandfather. As Lewis notes: 
123 
 
You can reasonably choose the narrower delineation, and say that he can; or the wider 
delineation, and say that he can’t. But choose. What you mustn’t do is waver, say in the 
same breath that he both can and can’t, and then claim that this contradiction proves that 
time travel is impossible. 
 
Mellor’s view that backwards causation allows for something which is contingently 
possible to be necessarily impossible is thus based on an equivocation. If we are clear 
about what ‘can’ is taken to mean (and most importantly, what facts are to be considered) 
then no contradiction is apparent. 
 
The second way in which Mellor’s argument fails is that it is essentially the same 
old objection in new packaging. Mellor does have his own views about the determinants of 
the direction of time, but – like others before – he argues from the logical impossibility of 
certain actions which a time traveller might try to commit upon arriving in the past (such as 
killing his or her own grandfather) to the logical impossibility of backwards time travel 
journeys. My reply to this objection is the same as that I gave in Chapter 3.
124
 While it may 
be logically impossible for someone to travel back in time and prevent their own existence, 
successful backwards time travel journeys do not necessarily entail these sorts of scenarios. 
Our conception of a case of backwards time travel does not require us to conceive of 
someone creating this paradox. 
 
Mellor’s first objection to backwards causation once again distracts us from the real 
issue at hand: the conceivability – and thereby logical possibility – of time travel journeys. 
There are many impossible things that the time traveller might do upon arriving in the past, 
just as there are many impossible things I might do upon arriving at any other temporal or 
spatial destination. This does not, however, refute the possibility of the journey in the first 
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place. As Sider notes, “the impossibility of a certain kind of time travel scenario does not 
impugn the possibility of time travel in general”.125 The time traveller does not need to 
engage in activities which might result in contradictions. All he needs to be able to do is 
arrive in the past, something that will be possible so long as it was the case that he arrived 
in the past. 
 
 
6.3 Mellor’s Second Objection 
 
Mellor acknowledges two other potential problems with his conclusion regarding 
the Grandfather Paradox, namely:
126
 
 
1. That it rests on the controversial assumption that there are contingent facts about what 
is possible at a time, as well as about what is actual. 
2. That it does not tell us what these contingent possibilities have to do with causation, 
and so with backward causation and time travel. 
 
Mellor attempts to remedy these problems by restating his objection to backwards 
causation. It seems, however, that this is better treated as a separate objection altogether. 
 
Mellor’s objection is based on two presuppositions. Firstly, Mellor presupposes that 
“every effect has chances with and without its causes”.127 Secondly, Mellor presupposes 
the law of large numbers,
128
 that is, the law that states that the frequency of some event 
will closely reflect its probability of occurrence. For example, if I buy one hundred raffle 
tickets, each of which has a one-in-ten (0.1) chance of winning, then I can assume that the 
total number of winning tickets I have will be approximately ten (one-tenth of one 
hundred). Mellor uses these two assumptions to build an argument against the logical 
impossibility of backwards causation. He does this by taking effects which precede their 
causes to the next step – closed causal loops. 
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Causal loops are often used as a basis for arguing against the possibility of 
backwards time travel. The simplest of these arguments is the Knowledge Paradox. 
Consider the following story:
129
 
 
An art critic from the future visits a 20
th
-century painter, who is regarded in the critic’s own 
century as a great artist. Seeing the painter’s current work, the critic finds it mediocre and 
concludes that the artist has yet to produce those inspired paintings that so impressed future 
generations. The critic shows the painter a book of reproductions of these later works. The 
painter contrives to hide this book, forcing the critic to leave without it, and then sets about 
meticulously copying the reproductions onto canvas. Thus, the reproductions exist because 
they are copied from the paintings, and the paintings exist because they are copied from the 
reproductions.  
 
This is a troubling story, as the artist’s work seems to appear from nowhere. It is, to 
use David Deutsch and Michael Lockwood’s term, “a kind of artistic ‘free lunch’”.130 
There is no end to the range of unusual causal loops authors are capable of creating. In The 
Case of Jocasta Jones
131
 a time traveller is able to father himself, while in All You 
Zombies
132
 the time traveller – through a combination of time travel and gender 
reassignment – is able to become his own father and his own mother.There is no doubt that 
these sorts of stories are incredibly unusual, and it is difficult to imagine how such a chain 
of events might even get started. Despite this, however, there is nothing contradictory 
about them. They are not logically impossible states of affairs. Why, then, does Mellor 
believe that they are? 
 
In order to effectively explain Mellor’s argument, I will provide my own example 
of a very simple causal loop in which only two causal factors are present, each being both 
the cause and the effect of the other. Suppose that one of these causal factors is “having a 
high-paying job” (A) and the other is “being a member of a privileged socio-economic 
group” (B): 
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Suppose that these two causal factors are genuinely independent. A describes the 
income of an individual, while B instead describes the socio-economic position of that 
same person in terms of their access to particular resources.
133
 We can also make a 
persuasive argument for each causal factor being a cause of the other. An individual who is 
a member of a privileged socio-economic group will have access to a better education, and 
will therefore have an increased chance of obtaining a career in a highly skilled (and highly 
paid) profession. Further, an individual who has a high-paying job will have an increased 
chance of becoming a member of a privileged socio-economic group, as the remuneration 
they receive will make more resources and opportunities available to them. 
 
Suppose, then, that the following facts are true: 
 
1. The probability of your having a high-paying job if you are a member of a 
privileged socio-economic group is 0.7. 
2. The probability of your having a high-paying job if you are not a member of a 
privileged socio-economic group is 0.4. 
3. The probability of your being a member of a privileged socio-economic group 
if you have a high-paying job is 0.9. 
4. The probability of your being a member of a privileged socio-economic group 
if you do not have a high-paying job is 0.2. 
 
These facts can then be stated more succinctly as follows: 
 
1. p(A) if B is 0.7 
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2. p(A) if ~B is 0.4 
3. p(B) if A is 0.9 
4. p(B) if ~A is 0.2 
 
Consider a population of 1000 people, and assume that 200 of them are members of 
a privileged socio-economic group. If this is so, then 140 (0.7 × 200) of those who are 
members of a privileged socio-economic group will have high-paying jobs, while 60 (0.3 × 
200) will not. Of those who are not members of a privileged socio-economic group 320 
(0.4 × 800) will have high-paying jobs, while 480 (0.6 × 800) will not. Out of the 
population of 1000 then, 460 individuals will have high-paying jobs, and 540 will not: 
 
 
 
 
Have a 
High-Paying Job 
 
Do Not Have a 
High-Paying Job 
 
Members of a Privileged 
Socio-Economic Group 
 
140 60 
 
Not Members of a 
Privileged 
Socio-Economic Group 
 
320 480 
 
TOTALS 
 
460 540 
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But consider what this means for the number of individuals in this society who are 
members of a privileged socio-economic group. If 460 individuals have high-paying jobs, 
then 414 (0.9 × 460) of those with high-paying jobs will be members of a privileged socio-
economic group, while 46 (0.1 × 460) will not. Of those without high-paying jobs, 108 (0.2 
× 540) will be members of a privileged socio-economic group, while 432 (0.8 × 540) will 
not. Out of the population of 1000, then, 522 individuals will be members of a privileged 
socio-economic group, and 478 will not: 
 
 
 
 
Members of a Privileged 
Socio-Economic Group 
 
 
Not Members of a 
Privileged 
Socio-Economic Group 
 
 
Have a 
High-Paying Job 
 
414 46 
 
Do Not Have a 
High-Paying Job 
 
108 432 
 
TOTALS 
 
522 478 
 
 
But this goes against the very assumption we made to begin with – that is, that this 
population contained 200 individuals who were members of a privileged socio-economic 
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group. According to Mellor, many probabilistic combinations will result in this sort of 
contradiction, and these contradictions will arise no matter how many links are in the 
causal loop. Mellor therefore argues that all causal loops, and thus all backwards time 
travel journeys, are logically impossible. 
 
 
6.4 Responding to Mellor’s Second Objection 
 
 Mellor is correct in stating that all effects have chances with and without their 
causes, and that over time one expects to see the frequency of an event being proportional 
to its probability. When considering causal loops, however, Mellor takes these rules – 
particularly the second one – to be inviolable. Put simply, Mellor holds that the frequency 
of an event must be proportional to its probability. Nicholas J.J. Smith explains how 
probabilistic expectations would go out the window if time travel became an everyday 
occurrence.
134
 I do not intend to repeat that argument here. Instead, it is enough to note 
that, by definition, the occurrence of a causal loop requires the occurrence of all its 
constituent causal factors – regardless of what their individual chances of occurring 
actually are. 
 
Consider a causal loop containing only two causal factors (Y) and (Z), and suppose 
that each causal factor has a probability of 0.1 of causing the other factor, That is: 
 
1. p(Y) if Z is 0.1 
2. p(Z) if Y is 0.1 
 
 If each causal factor occurs, then the causal loop – however improbable – will be 
self-sustaining. Mellor labours under the mistaken assumption that on each ‘lap’ of the 
causal loop the chances of causally related events actually occurring leads to an ever 
decreasing spiral of improbabilistic outcomes. On Mellor’s view, then, the fact that p(Y) if 
(Z) = 0.1, and p(Z) if (Y) = 0.1, means that p(Y) if Z if Y = 0.01. This is not the case 
however, and to think this way seems to come very close to committing the second-time 
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around fallacy.
135
 If Y causes Z, and Z causes Y, then this is what occurs. It does not matter 
how unlikely it is that each of these events causes the other.  
 
Perhaps, however, this criticism of Mellor is somewhat uncharitable – and his 
argument concerning the inherent probabilistic contradictions of causal loops still holds. If 
this is so, then I have a much simpler reply to give: namely, the same reply that was given 
to Mellor’s first objection: Backwards time travel does not require causal loops, so our 
conception of backwards time travel does not require us to conceive of them. This is due to 
the fact that many (if not most) events are causally unrelated. 
 
To be clear, an example of a causal loop is where A causes B, B causes C, and C 
causes A. Such a story can be pictured as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I contend, however, that backwards causation – and, by virtue of this, backwards 
time travel – does not require us to conceive of causal loops. Instead, our conception of a 
case of backwards causation only requires us to conceive of a causal arc. A causal arc 
occurs where an effect merely precedes its cause. An example of a causal arc is where A 
causes B, and B occurs earlier than A. Such a story can be pictured as follows: 
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A B C 
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A causal arc will not become a causal loop unless the effect instigates a chain of 
causal dependence which links up with the initial cause (just as A, B, and C do in the 
earlier diagram). 
 
Our conception of Vincent’s backwards time travel journeys only required of us to 
conceive of causal arcs. That is, Vincent’s disappearance at 12.00pm was a cause of 
Vincent’s appearance at 6.00am. These stories would only contain causal loops if 
Vincent’s arrival in the past somehow affected his departure in the future, and none of 
Vincent’s backwards time travel stories contained such a fact. If this was not explicit, then 
we could easily include extra facts in the story to make sure that it is, such as having 
Vincent travel to a remote spatial location during his backwards time travel journey so that 
he arrives in the past somewhere greatly removed where he will depart.
136
 
 
Our ability to conceive of backwards causation, and thus backwards time travel, 
only depends on our ability to conceive of causal arcs. For this reason, the logical 
impossibility of causal loops (if they are in fact logically impossible – a point of which I 
am not convinced), does not entail the logical impossibility of all cases of backwards time 
travel. At best, it would merely entail the logical impossibility of certain kinds of 
backwards time travel stories, namely those containing causal loops. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Mellor outlines a widely adopted theory of causation – one that defines temporal 
order as causal order. Such a theory is perfectly compatible with the logical possibility of 
backwards time travel. 
 
Despite this compatibility, Mellor raises two objections to the logical possibility of 
backwards time travel. Since conceivability entails possibility, and we can clearly conceive 
of cases of backwards time travel, Mellor’s argument must be flawed in some way. This 
flaw is located in the fact that Mellor argues from the impossibility of some cases of 
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backwards time travel to the impossibility of all backwards time travel journeys. Causal 
loops and paradoxes in which a time traveller kills their own grandfather may very well be 
logically impossible, but our ability to conceive of backwards time travel in no way 
necessitates that we conceive of these sorts of situations. Some cases of backwards time 
travel are impossible. Where Mellor makes his error is in arguing that this means all cases 
of backwards time travel are impossible. 
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Chapter 6: Final Conclusion 
 
 
 There are many impossible time travel stories: stories that involve time travellers 
changing the past, killing their younger selves, or creating any number of other paradoxical 
scenarios. Despite this, there are also many time travel stories that are entirely conceivable. 
If the conceivability thesis is true, then the conceivability of these stories entails their 
logical possibility. 
 
 All instantaneous forwards time travel journeys are conceivable. Stories in which a 
time traveller activates his time machine and finds himself instantly transported to some 
future point in time (just as Marty McFly does when he travels back to the future) are 
therefore logically possible. The same is true for cases of gradual forwards ‘time travel’. 
Stories in which a traveller activates his machine and finds himself gradually transported to 
some future point in time (just as the protagonist in H.G. Wells’ The Time Machine does) 
are therefore also logically possible. Unfortunately however, these sorts of conceivable 
stories are not conceivable time travel stories. This is due to the fact that they fail the time 
discrepancy requirement for a genuine case of time travel. 
 
 The conceivability of backwards time travel journeys is more contentious. It is 
important, however, to make a distinction between the conceivability of these journeys and 
the conceivability of certain things that the time traveller might try to do in the past. I have 
argued that all instantaneous backwards time travel journeys are entirely conceivable. 
There are plenty of inconceivable things the time traveller might do upon arriving in the 
past, but this is uninteresting. There are plenty of impossible things any traveller might do 
upon the conclusion of any sort of journey, but this tells us nothing about the possibility of 
those journeys. It is conceivable that the time traveller at least gets to the past – and this is 
all that genuine backwards time travel requires. He must of course travel to some location 
where he actually arrived in order for the story to be conceivable, but again, this is nothing 
surprising. It will always be inconceivable for someone to arrive at a location where they 
do not arrive. This will be true whether that individual is travelling through time, space, or 
any other sort of dimension. 
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 Depending on how the story is told, a gradual backwards time travel journey may 
fail to be conceivable. The time traveller might, for example, collide with his earlier self if 
he stays stationary and merely reverses his direction in time. This is what is referred to as 
the Double Occupancy Problem. Despite this, there are many cases of gradual backwards 
time travel journeys that are conceivable, and one such example was given at the 
conclusion of Chapter 3. This demonstrates that there is nothing essentially inconsistent 
about gradual backwards time travel journeys. 
 
 I have argued that the conceivability of different kinds of time travel should inform 
the metaphysical views we choose to adopt. The conceivability of any case of time travel 
entails the conceivability of travel to other times, so any plausible theory of time must be 
able to account for this. Views, like presentism, which are commonly held to preclude the 
logical possibility of time travel must either be modified to allow for its possibility, or 
abandoned altogether.  
 
 I also argued that the conceivability of instantaneous time travel entails the logical 
possibility of causation at a distance, while the conceivability of backwards time travel 
entails the logical possibility of backwards causation. Any plausible theory of causation 
must therefore be able to account for the possibility of these two types of causation. 
 
Of particular concern is the logical possibility of backwards causation, something 
that many theories of causation – including that put forward by D.H. Mellor – hold to be 
necessarily contradictory. Mellor gives two arguments against the possibility of backwards 
causation. Firstly, he focuses on how backwards causation gives rise to impossible 
scenarios such as the Grandfather Paradox. My reply to this was the same as before 
however. The Grandfather Paradox is merely an example of something a time traveller 
might try to do upon arriving in the past. Backwards time travel does not necessarily entail 
these sorts of occurrences. Secondly, Mellor alleges that the possibility of backwards 
causation entails the possibility of causal loops, and that these too are contradictory. In 
reply, I argued that causal loops were not contradictory and that, even if they were, 
backwards time travel does not necessarily entail their creation. Instead, backwards time 
travel only requires causal arcs. While the impossibility of causal loops might preclude the 
possibility of some time travel stories, it does not preclude all of them. 
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 Many time travel stories – including stories of both backwards and forwards time 
travel – are conceivable. Further, the conceivability of these stories entails their logical 
possibility. Our metaphysical views should be made to accommodate this. 
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